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ABSTRACT
In Defense of Political Ecology:

A Moral Conception of Ecological Obligation
(May 1985)

Stanley Jerome Weinstein
B.A. American University

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Prof essor Jerome King

The suppressed thesis of this work is that environ-

mental and natural resource policies in the advanced industrial countries, and especially in the United States, can

not work to bring about the stated goals of legislative

policies such as the National Environmental Protection Act
or the Endangered Species Act because the clearest and

strongest tenets of these legislative ideas are in fundamental conflict with the self-description of most modern

people and their self -reflection in their shaping of

institutions
The more concretely stated thesis is based on

a

model of the contemporary industrial person as having shed

older identities and having taken on

a

self-created nature,

one that owes nothing to the natural world but owes everyV

.

thing to the created environment.

The thesis, then, is

that a new human type has made the concept of
environmen-

talism impossible to realize.
Cracks in the modern collective ego of industrial

societies suggest that

counter current could conceivably

a

cause a sense of deep uncertainty about our self -definition
The environmentalist qua preservationist might possibly

succeed in articulating

a

"reason" why we should stop de-

stroying wild nature, and that we should attempt to

communicate this reason to other nations.

Thus far the

preservationists have failed to state the reason that
motivates their own behavior.

The remainder of this work

is devoted to articulating the needed reason,

the philo-

sophical and political coherence of this rationality.
The sense of this idea is that we owe duties not to others
first, but to ourselves.

notion we started with.

Yet "self" is the very problematic

Our very self -definition

,

which

shapes our notions of ethics, distorts the old under-

standing of duties to ourselves.
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INTRODUCTION

In the abstract for this dissertation it is stated

that preservationists have not been able to offer

a

reason

for their behavior stemming from their desire to save wild

nature from the onslaught of modern thinking and action.
This statement is open to misinterpretation because in

a

very concrete way the preservationists have indeed stated

their views, and hence have said why they will and do act.
By a "reason"

for action.

I

mean, however, far more than

Anyone can put forth

according to it, but in some cases
exacted for doing so.
some spectrum of ideas.

a

rationale

viewpoint and act

a
a

terrible price may be

Social behavior has to fit within
A reason for action, then, must

conform to an accepted notion of rationality, that is,
social discourse which allows
a

a

set of behaviors.

a

To give

reason why the majority of society should cease to act

in a certain way with respect to a certain range of meanings
is all

the more problematic.

To gain legitimacy,

to gain

entry into the realm of accepted discourse is difficult
enough, to attempt to cancel discourse accepted as legiti-

mate requires what some philosophers call, perhaps too

vaguely,

a

paradigm revolution.

1

2

The major thrust of this work is to
map out the

route to the revision of rationality and
its actions.
Of course, current practice is to weigh
wildlife and other

nonhuman life on an economic scale.

Preservationists,

perhaps unknowingly, act as if to suggest

a

form of

rational behavior fundamentally at odds with the industrial
mind.

dity of

Yet no preservationist has ever suggested the absura

pieces of

retreat to an earlier social epoch.
a

notion evoking

a

Bits and

sustainable society have been

discussed, although no one has theorized about the nature
of the self that would be requisite for such a society.

A new discourse does not gain admission from outside
the social consciousness, but is constructed from the ruins
of old ideas,

from the tension within

a

society.

Although

environmental politics is well-known in the form of "Green"
parties, eco-f eminists
of wild species,

,

and lobbyists for the preservation

the rational grounds for these views are

poorly understood.

In order to spell out the nature of a

political ecology it is necessary to construct its foundation
and "deconstruct" the bases for the ideas that put in motion
the forces indifferent to the earth.

This work is conceptual rather than historical.

Numerous works have already traced the historical roots of
our environmental problems.

The project of

a

social theory

to displace the tradition from Hobbes to Adam Smith and to

3

Max Weber must take a new turn, the ecological turn.

The

move proceeds from reflections on contemporary events to a

reflection on the nature of the self brought into being by
a

process which for now can be called "abstraction."
The procedure leads us to consider the core meaning

of environmentalism and the social idea behind it.

The

problem, sharpened in chapter two, leads to the conclusion
that moral and political terms taken together are the only
ones useful toward a definition of ecological society.

realize that the ecological turn means

a

We

revision of the fu-

ture as set out for us by Hobbes, Smith, and Weber.

Similar-

ly a reconsideration of morality in a political context can

only be discussed if there is

a

new basis for thinking of

human life directed toward ends that serve
sensibility.

If,

as the tradition has it,

social life is analogous to

a

a

life-regarding

the point of

closed loop, then the fate of

the earth, almost certainly, is to die slowly.

time,

At the same

the fate of a certain human image will be to give way

to a cynical creature bent on self-absorption, power, and

destruction, images from the tradition.

.

CHAPTER

I

HOMOCENTRISM VERSUS ECOCENTRISM

The Problem of Environmentalism

Perhaps the most urgent question confronting modern

man/woman is what kind of world they want to have.

By

"world" we mean the physical landscape and the human kind
that will inhabit it.

and grow.

The present course is to multiply

Soon our landscape will be

a

ment and all wilderness will disappear.

jungle of develop-

There are many

environmentalists who mourn each loss of wilderness and see
in each passing the possibility that a certain human kind

will fade away

Social theorists, philosophers, and other students
of the life of the mind and society have tended to treat

their question-problems as if human life existed in our built
spaces and nowhere else.

Indeed, they have tended to treat

human life as if it were the only life and the only significant entity on earth.

Both our intellectual and social life

encourage the assumption that humanity is self-sufficient.
Our questions about the status and nature of morality, the

ultimate basis for knowledge of the objective world, and
4

5

the nature of a social science all assume that our
humanity

has remained unchanged through the ages and that our
humanity is the only subject of concern to theorists of mind

and society.

About our humanity, we moderns have come to suppose
that minds are the locus of our being.

When we do consider

our bodies, we tend to suppose them to be largely abstracted
from a place, a supposition further encouraged by our forays
into outer space.

brings to mind

environment.

a

Thus, the world we represent to ourselves

mental space more than it does

a

lived

Our disembodied minds allow us to think of

ourselves in terms of our own rationality.

We are in this

manner locked into thinking about ourselves as rational
egos, precluding an idea of humanity as bound up with tra-

ditions and customs distinctly tied to
and its land.
a

a

particular place

Modernity, of course, has been treated as
It presents

theme from countless perspectives.

difficulty, however, to the quest for

a

social science, an

understanding of the social in these terms.
one reason to raise this issue.

the most

There is but

The quest for

a

social

science has never been couched in terms of the modern

human type standing in sharp contrast to the antiquated

human types of various traditions.

Max Weber gave us the

categories in which we think of modern bureaucratic society
and the humanity it embodies; but we have little under-

6

standing of the deep contrast by which we
may further
understand the modern self. Furthermore, Claude
LeviStrauss gave us insights into the nature of the
primitive
mind, but we have no method by which to grasp
the problem
of modern humanity as a shift in consciousness
from an

"inhabitant" to

a

socially constructed being.

The project here is to present both the rudiments
of a method and an inquiry into the nature of humanity

devoid of being, that is,

a

human created by the social

fabric and not conscious of any debt to the natural world.

Because

a

great many people have voiced serious doubts

about the vast, ongoing destruction of wildlife, forests,

antarctic ecosystems, and ocean life including the great
mammals and birds, it becomes apparent that

a

segment of

humanity experiences the extinction of wild nature as
loss.

a

Hence, this inquiry could focus on the question

"what is environmentalism?" but the reader would be apt to

miss the deeper problem persisting beneath the flotsam of

questions about the destruction of the environment.
clue that there is

a

The

deeper problem is easy to discover.

Policy makers are mirrors of the social mind, the prevailing rationality.

Environmental and natural resource policy

are based on the ideas we hold about the "workability"
of a modern (post)

industrial social system.

Given the

ideas moderns have of themselves and their social world,

7

it is not surprising that the nonhuman world finds
no

place in the self-understanding of modern people.
if nonhumanity has no place in our psyches,

to the world of commodities.

And,

then it belongs

The logic of all this would

be tight and well accepted, except that it is not; at least
it

is not completely accepted.

That a battle rages with

the point of having this logic internalized by all is not

arguable.

What is of interest is the rebellion itself,

the rebellion against being disinherited from a form of

humanity, from
swept away by

a
a

form of thought and action that is being

virulent strain of humanity.

The upshot, the sense of this inquiry, is to under-

stand, interpret the nature of this sensibility that

refuses to go quietly into the good night.

quiddity of this version of humanity?

What is the

What kind of world

would be manifest if such people were dominant?
would rationality take?

What forms

To answer these queries,

the

method of interrogation from the hypothetical standpoint
of what may be called "ecocentri sm" is required.

The

standpoint itself is fairly well understood in the philosophical literature on ecological understanding; the social
theory, the politics, its thought and action are much less
well understood.

Feminist ecology has been developed along

the lines of a nonexploi tive world view espousing philo-

sophical holism.'*'

But something more than a set of
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principles is required to grasp the
problems we moderns face,
and the kind of alternative that would
both manage problems
of scarcity, resolve problems of
artificial
scarcity, and

create more humane and equitable conditions
for

populated world.

Rather than propound

a

a

less

set of a priori

principles for ameliorating the human condition
(the worst
kind of theorizing), the point here is to
understand the
ecocentric self and the moral science it entails.
More superficially, it has been thought that

environmentalists seek

a

clean, beautiful, and spacious

world to ultimately benefit themselves.

It is charged that

the kind of world they want is one molded in their own

image, while other people want

a

different world, one that

is highly developed and taps every existing resource.

The

proponents of social wealth view instrumentally the earth
and what it contains.

world as

a

They see features of the nonhuman

means to an end, the end being social wealth.

The world molded in the image of these "possessive individ-

uals" is

a

strange image, for it does not have

a

human face

but only of the things they possess.

Instrumentalists, as we will call the proponents
of social wealth, reply that the end which they seek is

not really social wealth but rather the kind of pleasure

and happiness derived from material goods.

What their

spokespersons say is that they hold to certain ideas of

9

the good, namely human well-being

,

which is grounded in the

premise that human well-being is intrinsically
good.
course, the idea of what constitutes
"well-being,"

Of

v>;hat

kind of

a

world would be required for human well-being,

is open to widely diverse interpretations.

The contemporary conflict between environmentalists

and such instrumentalists seems, then, to reflect

a

debate

between two view of the good life or what has come to be
called "the quality of life" schism.

As such,

little to consider in this extreme relativism.

there is
Yet this

is where the question of environmentalism has been left,

as a conflict between opposing wants and desires.

It should

be understood from the opening statements and questions that

this notion of environmentalism is bogus and also absurd.

The explanation follows.

Environmentalists point out that value is

a

slippery

term, for the instrumentalists ascribe value only to human

states of mind and not to intrinsic qualities of being

discerned in nonhuman entities.

Environmentalists further

point out that value in the hands of the instrumentalists
is always human value in that they see no value inherent

in any other life form.

The term commonly applied to this

phenomenon is "anthropocentrism
is profoundly unsatisfactory.

,

"

For

term that on reflection

a

a

term reflecting

a

polar meaning opposite to anthropocentrism we will need to
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do some searching.

The fact is that a ready opposite to

anthropocentrism is not available.
Before we look for

a

term of contrasting meaning,

we should try to better understand the term.

First note

that the term is wrongly applied to instrumentalists alone.

Consider that many people value human states of mind or
qualities of other people or the possession of knowledge
as having intrinsic worth, but at the same time do not see

intrinsic value in any nonhuman features of the world.
Many people see value as having meaning only when applied
to human attributes;

anthropocentrists

.

they

are not instrumentalists but

Our term suggests to us that human

language is about the human world, about the world humans
have made for themselves; we value that which we have made
or that

by

which things are produced.

further suggests that it is only within
a

Anthropocentrism
a

human context,

world which has been built up and evolved, that humans

see things as having worth.

Suppose, for example,-

Australopithecus were valuing animals.

The world they saw

was undifferentiated; there was no human world.

them was simple instrumentality.

Value to

As language evolved into

something which is about "our world," we learned the habit
of saying that which is "good" or has value in itself is

distinguishable from nonhuman things.
people into

a

human world.

Language locks

Anthropocentrism in some

.

.

.
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respect is unavoidable because

a

world of value is built

up by language.

Only if we can jump over our shadow
and
somehow posit value in the nonhuman
world can we escape all
aspects of anthropocentrism. Since we
cannot do this completely, we are all, to some extent,
anthropocentris ts
If we are to understand the core of
environmentalism which
is non-anthropocentric,

we must eschew the language of

value altogether, and move on to what may be

a

deeper

analysi s
At this point we are searching for terminology

with which to frame the problem of environmentalism.

We

must reach new terminology genuinely; we cannot shed the
old simply by fiat, so for the moment we are stuck with
our original terms.

Let us return to our analysis of the

problem
Environmentalists want to preserve the planet Earth
and all of its nonhuman inhabitants.

Instrumentalists may

also want to preserve nonhuman life, but only because much

nonhuman life directly or indirectly benefits humans.
Nonetheless, it appears there are two kinds of environmentalists, so the term is unclear.

What is clear is that

there is widespread agreement about how humans are de-

stroying much of the nonhuman life on earth and by so

doing possibly creating conditions which threaten human

viability in the future.

L2

Given this agreement, very many people have recog-

nized the need for

a

morality adequate to the concept of

ecological obligation, since anthropocentric morality is
not much of a basis for the consideration of nonhuman life.

Still, instrumentalists argue that we need consider only

what is good for humans

,

and that it is perfectly possible

to arrange the world accordingly.

Some environmentalists

take the opposite view, that it is not possible to consider

human wants alone and also maintain conditions on earth

which ensure human life in the future.

However, the

meaning of environmental preservation lies not in this
scientific and practical prediction, but rather in

a

view

about the nature of the self in society.
As this work unfolds, a social critique will be

elaborated which deals with the question of how modern
industrial society can be understood in

nating way.

The question of

a

a

new and illumi-

social critique from within

and the grounds for such a critique will also concern us.

These general statements about the nature of the

problem give us an understanding of the social theoretical

meaning of the present project, but not much more than
this.

In a deep way the problem defies simple statement.

We might be content to say that this work addresses the

question:

what is environmentalism?

This question is

unsatisfactory because almost nothing in any of the
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relevant literature suggests the
concepts which, it will
be argued, are needed to answer
a question that is widely
believed to be straightforward.
Arguments about the nature
of selfhood rarely mention in
the same connection
the

question about the meaning of wild nature.
will be drawn in detail.

This connection

Among the several sub-theses

involved in the present argument, one is
crucial.
that the question:

It is

why ought one be ecologically obli-

gated? is unintelligible because the subject,
the "one"
who is to be so obligated, is opaque, obscure,
and

a

mystery to ourselves.
We moderns may ask why it is so important or urgent
to question,

as many environmentalists do,

the foundations

of our old traditions and habits in dealing with nature.

Interrogations of the environmentalist's quest to save wild
nature from the technocratic rationale for development and

commerce might bring questions like the relation of everyman s/everywoman
'

or its habitat.
the long run?

'

s

happiness to the destruction of wildlife

What does

a

little destruction matter in

It is possible to reply that the state of

the nonhuman world mirrors the human condition.

Yet if

the human condition is such that moderns do not see any

problem, then who can say that any problem exists?

precisely the dilemma of certain environmentalists.

This is
If

they are critical of industrial people for their wanton

14

disregard of nonhuman life, they are apt
to be looked upon
as somehow absurd.
Yet, if they remain silent

they default

on any possibility of reversing the
destruction.

Are we anthropocentric?

Anthropocentrism is

a

useful term in some contexts,

but we do not believe it to be a satisfactory term
to

describe the condition of modern industrial peoples.

In

many historical contexts value has been ascribed to the

nonhuman world only in so far as aspects of the nonhuman
world benefit humans, and not because of any intrinsically

valuable qualities.

A human-centered approach to the world

is not strikingly new.

The medieval Europeans were anthro-

pocentric and so were the ancient Greeks.
shown by

It has been

number of scholars that ancients often destroyed

a

aspects of their environment in order to secure needed
resources.

2

Timber, for example, became

in the middle ages.

3

a

major resource

Indeed, the Romans and others before

them were clear-cutting forests.

4

A great deal of wild-

life habitat was destroyed in early times.

Animals were

directly destroyed for their fur and meat.

These are

anthropocentric attitudes and they have been with us for
ages

.

The question remains whether the subject involved

in these attacks on wild nature was the same,

the identical

subject or actor, who inhabits the modern world.

15

When we said we must search for

a

term of contrast

to "anthropocentrism," we were suggesting
an ambiguity.

For anthropocentrism can be seen as

a

narrow and selfish

attitude on the part of humans in that only they count
for

something of value.

Or it can mean that, unlike the forces

of the anti-rational and demonic, there is a rational
world

of value having at its center a moral agency from which
this value emanates.

The semantics of anthropocentrism

falls into into this gestalt.

The terminology we want

must escape this fatal ambiguity.

That is, we must recog-

nize that one possible term of contrast to anthropocentrism
or human-centered is "allocentrism" or other-centered, and
by extension we may mean "holocentric" or world-centered.

Let us see whether we gain anything by this move.

Now we

do gain something by contrasting "allocentric" or "holo-

centric" to "egocentric"; we move from self as the center
to world as the center.

siveness.

We gain a generalized all-inclu-

We have no difficulty understanding the gain

made my moving from narrow selfishness to
tarianism.
these terms.

a

wider humani-

But anthropocentrism can encompass both of
We can surely see that a world-centered

orientation can be human-centered in the broadest sense,
if we are speaking of language and value.

centered is suggestive of

a

Because world-

world of value, we tend to

stay within the anthropocentric orbit.

16

The ambiguity of anthropocentrism is instructive.

Many an environmental writer has charged that modern people
are anthropocentric

Yet, unless there is an attractive

.

alternative we may have to accept that such people are
(ambiguously)

a

center of value.

suggested do not change matters.

The two contrasting terms

Homocentrism

,

a

complex

term we will be developing, is not the kind of opposite
that can be described as "attractive," and allocentric is

not clearly an opposite since it can be seen to reinforce
the very ambiguity we want to escape.

will make comes down to this.

The argument we

We are stuck with apparent

anthropocentric language and consciousness during most of
our waking lives unless we can change to a new mode of

consciousness that can readily be described.
cause the change to

problematic.

a

VJhat

might

new mode of consciousness is deeply

We may interrogate the discourses which con-

stitute the modern consciousness in order to bring into
To give it a name

view the nature of the modern self.

and to distinguish it from traditional anthropocentrism

perhaps the designation "homocentrism" will do.
this terminology obliges us to find

a

Using

convenient designa-

tion for the consciousness against which it stands.

The

term "ecocentrist " has often been used in the environmental

literature, and so it will be adopted here.

17

How can it be demonstrated
that human-valuecenteredness no longer exists in
the modern world?
The
anthropocentrist, whom we moderns
mythologize as the very
essence of our meaning, eludes
capture in the substantial
present, in our quotidian dealings.
The highly rationalized existence of industrial countries
filters out of

consciousness the ingredients of the
traditional human
face, one inimical to the historical
understandings
of

anthropos.

The centrism to which we attach the
concept

of our being no longer belongs to
anthropos

,

but to a

human cipher inheriting the place occupied
by the traditional language users.
The self as occupier and defender
of meanings has transformed its constitutional
nature as

self-interpreter.
ly)

Created meanings break apart (figurative-

in the contructed avenues of awareness manifest
in much

of our built space.

Our constructed consciousness leaves

us imprisoned in a set of rationalized structures of

meaning and action.

We are the products of our own creation

The argument is that we are not human-centered in

any conventional understanding of this phrase.

Rather,

traditional anthropocentri sm was the basis for moral
ideas not in principle hostile to nonhuman life.

Thus the

contemporary arguments which purport to explain our eager
destruction of wild nature on the grounds that we are
"anthropocentric" fail.

Ridding ourselves of the notion

18

that we are dealing with simple
anthropocentrism will help
us to draw out the far reaching
moral implication of a

homocentric narrowing of consciousness.
Spokespersons for our modern type might reply
that
we are attempting to create an issue
where none
exists,

arguing that

a

human-centered attitude is the province of

man/woman as

a

user of language and within this province

there will always be narrow-minded people as
well as

humanitarians; this, they might say, is the human condition
and to make more of a case than this is to intellectualize

about plain facts that have been apparent for millennia.
This is tempting bait, and if we take it the environmen-

talist's case collapses.

The bait is to get us to agree

that environmentalism is but one more attitude among many,

neither more right nor necessarily more agreeable than
many others.

Still, we will press our case.

For the pur-

pose of doing so is to penetrate the surface of everyday
life and to revise the terms of discourse in which to

examine the premise of modern consciousness.

Without this

move there can be no theory of the revision of consciousness
In our search for terminology we moved from instru-

mentalism to homocentrism because we wanted to get beyond
the language of value, and, more generally, beyond the

ordinary ideas about the world espoused by industrial man

.
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and woman.

An interrogator must not fall
into the familiar

meanings that serve the guardians of
the City, linguistic
conventions by which we moderns steer a known
course.

The

interrogator can transcend these barriers to
enlightenment
by breaking our ties to the conventions
of rationality

that link us to the persona of homocentrism
The interrogator begins, then, with the under-

standing of why we are impelled to this work of moral

dissection.

It involves the interrogator in an interpre-

tive estimate of modern social understanding in relation
to ideas apparently antithetical to our rational conventions.

Of course,

the sense of this is to dissect our own self-

understanding about our project as it serves to legitimate
our existence.

As we unravel this self, we bring into

question the foundation of its existence and hence the
legitimacy of the project.
More concretely, the emergence of environmentalism
has interrupted the complacent assumptions that technical-

economic rationality serve our wants and needs without any

side-effects that may ultimately cause
very processes.

a

breakdown of these

The history of environmentalism can be

characterized as having taken

a

dual path.

On the one

side, environmental thinking has thoroughly blended with

economic rationality.

Pollution

taxes,

economic incen-

tives, charges, and a whole economic vocabulary has sprung

.
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up.

On the other side is a quite
different environmentalism, one antithetical to this
rational mode of consciousness.
Although every force in the spectrum
of interests
has tried to bend this latter
approach to reality to its
own approach, these attempts have
failed.
In the present,
these same forces are attempting to
discredit this environ-

mentalism as aberrant thinking, as irrationalism

It

.

is

this mode of consciousness that we are
impelled to interrogate.

The aim is to understand whether the view of
the

world to be examined is

a

viable political alternative to

the destructive practices of the present.

To do this is to

grasp fully both modes of consciousness.

Homocentric consciousness
It is

important to avoid the tiresome descriptions

of environmental destruction and tirades against the greed,

willfulness, or egoism that have long characterized industrial attitudes toward the "human" environment and toward

wild nature.

The interrogation is a concern to dissect

this consciousness.

A central idea for anthropos

,

becoming

and the concept of the moral, is the basis for the human

model, anthropos

,

which is also the standpoint of the

interrogator
The phenomenon of moral neutralization has been

noted again and again in different guises, for example as

secularization and the modernization
of consciousness.
The idea that modernity
itself is responsible

for the alter
ations of consciousness is, in
an important way, fallacious
The built environment of modern
peoples is not in itself
responsible for the problem of
disrelational being. Rather
it was a condition for the
problem that grew into a transformation of the individual qua
subject to the individual
qua object.
By progressively internalizing
the "goals"
of society that are set for it
by the corporate technostructure, the individual gave up the
autonomy that defined
the senses in which individualism
was a viable idea.
We have now two strands to work with,

the concept

of moral neutralization and the
metamorphosis of selfhood.

The idea is that, in the eyes of anti-anthr5pos

,

existence

reinterpreted means existence in terms of the built
world
of social role players.

This version of selfhood carries

implications for the moral life of the individual.

It

bears on the relation of the self as agent to the sub-

stantial premise of morality.

Insight can be gained into

the nature of the modern self in terms of the context in

which (s)he operates, namely, the context of economic
rationality.

For there is no abstract actor-agent, but

only the socially determinate context for action which
gives rise to our interpretations of self and others.

.
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The determinate context is a wholly rationalized one.

One cultural element after another has been absorbed
into the ever-widening economy, subjected to the
test of economic rationality, rationalized and
turned into a commodity or factor of production.
So pervasive has this process been that it now seems
that anything can be thought of as utilities.
The elements that become commodities during
economic progress include time, land, capital, labor;
also personality itself, as well as all the artifacts
produced by man: art objects, ideas, experiences,
enjoyment itself, and even social relations.^
.

.

.

.

.

.

The point is not to "moralize" about moral neu-

tralization.

formation of

The substantial literature treating this

social entity functioning as a member of

a

the "work force," as having a place in the economy, and as

therefore a feature of existence, not
become
make

a

a

well-worn genre.

a

maker of it, has

The reader may thereby fail to

connection between this all too well accepted idea

of moral neutralization and the problem of the social

theorist's debate over facts versus values.

Moral neu-

tralization entails that values have no locus in

a

subject

and are therefore nothing but variations of individual

characteristics.
individual is

a

The subject turned into the subjective

description of the last stages in the

development toward homocentri sm
To conclude this section, a crucial item must be

mentioned in order to set the direction for the remainder
of this chapter and the dissertation as a whole.

abstract expression "bedrock of being"

is

The

to be used here

.
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as a sign post for the concept
of the foundation for

inthropos,
as a

human type that we will be at
pains to model
basis for critique of homocentrism
a

The foundation for anthropos,
then, is the basis

for the interrogation.

A basis for action can be
understood

in terms of the self's nature
rather than as stemming from
a set of abstract precepts or
rules.
The laying bare of
the self's nature (its deconstruct ion
will show a differ)

ence of sense, of nature, and hence

a

difference for action

and thought between anthr5pos and this
modern "homocentric"
self.

Explaining the bifurcation
The next step is to explain the self's metamorphosis

from anthropos in all of its original diversity to homos
in all of its sameness.

The phenomenon of the homocentric

self is inseparable from the built world in which it lives,

although it does not account for its nature.

The dissection

of homocentric consciousness can be accomplished only after
the reader understands the psychic distance, and not rather
the intellectual-historical distance, that separates con-

temporary social reality from the very different construct
of both anthropos and the contemporary ecocentrist.
In a recent volume on social theory there appears

an innocent statement that, perhaps unwittingly, captures
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the concept of the bifurcation.

The writer, paraphrasing

Emil Durkheim, tells us "...that
man can escape nature not
merely by controlling it but also by
creating another world
where he himself is at home and secure;
this 'world' is

society."^

Here we have an idea about the world
which

pays no attention to its animal origins;
the world available to consciousness is human and created
by us.
Con-

sciousness knows the other world as mere "thinghood."
We will note that we are not speaking about
a human-

centered world in which humans take primacy, but

a

world

from which nonhumans have been eliminated as subjects
and
are now largely being eliminated as physical beings.

one wishes to put it in

a

If

certain way, the category of

wild nature is being erased, an observation that some

writers have already made, as we see in this remark:
the concrete character of the social life of
the so-called advanced countries today
offer[s]
the spectacle of a world from which nature as such
has been eliminated, a world saturated with messages
•

•

•

.

.

.

and information, whose intricate commodity network
may be seen as the very prototype of a system of
signs.
There is therefore a profound consonance
between linguistics as a method and that systematized^
and disembodied mightmare which is our culture today.

There is

statements.

a

deep connection between the last two

A world saturated with formal messages is a

world already cut off from what is not human.
cate commodity network orients people to
ment of fabricated things and noise.

a

The intri-

built environ-

What we call
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"civilization," the re-invention of the world
to suit an
evolving need, is an accomplishment which
has brought with
it the hubris that man himself is
another kind
of god.

From this collective elation, it follows
that the animals
of the forest are taken to belong to the
realm of
thing-

hood.

Through this civilizing process humans invented
the
subject.
We mean by "subject" what could be meant by
"per-

son," the notion that personhood is some special
category
of life fully apart from other living forms.

personify the bear or the otter.

We do not

The "subject" is our

invention which we jealously guard.

Yet it is an inven-

tion; the person did not come into being with the advent
of the human.

history.

The concept of "person" has had a complex

Language too has evolved as

lizing process.

a part of

the civi-

We have brought into being the realms of

subject and object.

Let us treat our problem of the human

world as if all humans have always been treated as subjects
and not as belonging to the category of "it."

If we do

not, we confuse the issue in the way that advocates of

animal rights have done.

Civilization in one sense has meant comfort and
rest from the brutality of living undefended from the

elements.

How interesting that from the simple need for

protection and comfort we come to invent the subject.
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We are perhaps too confident that the
civilizing process

continues to refine our concept of the subject,
creating
an ever greater distance between ourselves and
"nature."

Instead, we may now see that we have brought ourselves
out beyond any world in which there is a basis in language
for any subject.

What have we done?

The intricate

commodity network makes no distinction between people
and things.

The private individual as consumer of things

is but a part of the commodity network.

The subject has

disappeared into this new scheme of things.

We cannot

see why this should be so until we look more closely at

how the subject came to be.

In the next chapter an exami-

nation of the concept of the relational self will give us
this understanding.

For now, let us say that the subject

has come and gone.
We must explain, however,

that the bifurcation in

consciousness is distinguished from

a

simple dichotomy

between what is human and what is nature.

In some non-

western societies, aspects of the nonhuman world are given
the status of subjects in various ritual ways.

often take on symbolic significance.
"

...

Nonhumans

For example,

in Phraan Muan Village the dog is treated as a

'degraded human'."

Beliefs may be as diverse as societies,

but we can find a certain consistency in many nonwestern

societies in the way animals are given symbolic significance
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as subjects.

The point here is that
in ™ost societies a
dichotomy exists between human
and nonhuman forms; for
example, taboos exist about
eating human flesh, but few
exist about eating animals.
This, of course, includes
most societies.
Yet, we mean by a bifurcation
in consciousness the "cutting" out from
consciousness of any
awareness of nature as a realm of
beings.
Nature as a

realm of things is looked upon as
an object world.
The
fact that a significant part of the
living world has
become an object does not give us a
clear view of the
human's own status.
Here is

a

peculiar situation, for the human world

does not remain a world of subjects standing
in contrast
to a world of objects.

not static.

The concept of the bifurcation is

The object language for nonhuman elements in

the world gradually becomes relevant to a situation in

the human world of society.
a

If the world of society is

commodity network, then what kind of human does this

world reflect?
question:

a

There is only one clear answer to this

human who uses an object language to express

the world, one which is now undifferentiated.

world is everywhere.

The object

As the human world has become a

world of commodities or things, the progression looks
1

ike thi s

.
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The homocentric model

Object
Nature

Nature

Object

Human

This conceptualized history of consciousness

shows a phase in which the human subject emerged from
a

long period of dwelling with nature in

grounded in being.

a

relation

Although there were, of course,

many human societies and traditions, the abstraction
draws on certain universal characteristics.

To articulate

these characteristics is part of the purpose of this

chapter.

Drawing

a

distinction between kinds of con-

sciousness is the main effort.

The initial split

between "object-nature" and "subject-human" should be

understood in terms of the present argument.

We homo-

centrists still believe, in spite of all evidence to the
contrary, that we are identifiable as "subject-humans,"
as in the Kantian ethic in which a person stood in con-

formity to

a

moral order.

.
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The diagram shows a progression
from consciousness

grounded in being to
off from nature.

a

point at which consciousness splits

This subject-object dualism finally ter-

minates in an objectifying consciousness of human
and

nature objects, the stage of homocentrism

.

At this stage

the bifurcation is complete and cannot logically
progress

any further.
The full intelligibility of the thesis can only

emerge from an understanding of the bifurcation and its

concrete sense in everyday discourse.

Interrogating this

discourse in terms of its object language brings out its

contradictoriness
Here are

a

couple of examples that show the homo-

centrist in the guise of the environmentalist using the
object language.

The homocentrist as oil importer seeks

to import oil cheaply and to make a profit.

commonly affect sea life and at times people.
of a spill,

Oil spills
The effect

for the oil importer, is not the death of

a

thousand sea birds, and possibly not the cost in social
terms, but rather the expense and inconvenience of causing
a

so-called disamenity.

For homocentric environmentalists,

the disamenity of a beach awash in oil makes it a much

less pleasant place to visit.

value sense is offended.

Perhaps their aesthetic

Perhaps they will appeal to an

argument about health, urging that the ocean environment
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ought to be better protected for such
reasons; clean oceans
provide healthier environments, and
beaches which do not

need to be cleaned up are cheaper to
maintain.
The whole idea, we will notice, of an
"environment"

becomes hopelessly entangled with the commodity
network.
An amenity is but one benefit among others;
a cost is

balanced by benefits, or so it is claimed.
The American Farmland Trust tell us that "America
is losing its farmland at an alarming rate."^

The Trust

goes on to tell us that:
The acreage that provides the best farmland
As our
population grows and more and more people move away
from big cities, the demand for this land becomes
greated and greater
and as the demand increases,
so too does the land value and the farmer's taxes
and as agricultural productivity becomes more and more
limited because of high energy costs and depleted soil
and water resources, the farmer today feels more and
more pressured to give in to the developers.
If the present trend continues through the
next decade, we'll face an irreversible national and
international crisis of unprecedented scope a crisis
that will have a dire effect on the quality of your
life, the cost of living, the quality and quantity
of food that will be available to you, and on America's
international relations, [emphasis added]^^
.

.

.

is also prime land for developers to build on.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

—

The change in the quality of life the Trust refers to may
be the disappearance of rural landscape, although it does

not say this or, at any rate, say why this is bad.

Its

reasons for why we should mobilize and act to prevent

farmland from disappearing are instrumental ones about the
loss of a commodity.

Here is a situation in which

.

2
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homocentrism is in conflict with itself;
the development
interest clashes with the farm interest.
The homocentrists
may be undermining the "quality" of their
existence, but

who is to argue that such actions are wrong?

other homocentrists!

Surely not

Homocentrists have no language with

which to express the idea that something beyond economic
value is being lost, something deeply intertwined with

another kind of existence for which we only have the romanticizing word "pastoral."
benefits

Back to the idea of costs and

.

Whether the homocentrist argues for optimal
pollution"'"''"

or optimal development, the unprincipled will

trudges along unbothered by the notion of optiraality.

When is the optimal point reached?

action become just plain wrong?
answer this question.
move to

When does

productive

The homocentrist cannot

To illustrate this point, we can

slightly different context.

a

a

Call this context

the question of optimal land use.

The American Farmland Trust suggests paying

farmers "the difference between the land's assessed agri-

cultural value and its development value,"
land is not lost to development.

There is

a

1

so that the

This is a losing battle.

certain dependence on the real estate value

remaining high enough so that an incentive to the farmer
remains.

Otherwise, if the difference between the agri-

3
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cultural value and the development value
are fairly close
together, the farmer may decide either
way.
He may reason
that he would be better off to sell
the farm to development
and not be bothered with labor and worry
about crop and

livestock prices every year.

As long as the farmer is

understood as an entrepreneur much like the developer,
the
farmer will behave according to the same principles
of

self interest as the developer.

The reason why farmers sell out to land interests
is,

of course,

economic.

As a businessman,

no longer afford to remain in business.
way,

land is being treated as

developer and the farmer.

the farmer can

Looked at another

commodity both by the

a

As long as these two enterprises

are made to compete for the same land treated as

a

commod-

ity value, the developer will more often win the struggle

because he is able to command a higher price than the
farmer.
If we turn to the pages of Wendell Berry's book

The Gift of Good Land

1
,

we will find a discussion through-

out the essays about the nature of farming, that is,

concept of land in relation to

a

concept of

works the land and is tied to the land.

a

a

person who

Berry's perplexity

about the ways of modern farming and the takeover of the

farm by agribusiness is due to his inattention to his own
concept.

Yet Berry's concept is of enormous importance.

.

.
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In ter.s of the l™™edlate
argument,

U

serves to show why

environmental optlmallty cannot
be achieved by calculat:
:ion
If consciousness is bent
on maximizing
profit, It

wlU

not

stop to ask If an optimal
point has been reached.
That Is,
the concept of optlmallty
cannot be understood as a
measurlment when the measured Item Is
a function of wants and
desires.
Optlmallty, in this context. Is a
product of a

consciousness seeking

a

form of moderation that serves
the

self in its relation to the substance
shaping that consciousness

Similar observations can be made about
the homocentric consciousness as it deals with
commodities or
"goods." An amenity like countryside is a

good, but instru-

mentalists make such amenities good in relation
to the
attainment of relative wealth. Land is valuable

for the

attainment of social wealth.

The homocentrist

,

whose

wants are usually limited only by practical necessity,
cannot argue for the preservation of, say, open space except
as one commodity among others.

Perhaps the homocentrist

is an "outdoorsperson" and wants to hike in wilderness

areas in leisure time.

This commodity has to be weighed

against the same piece of land as

resource area.

a

valuable natural

Which homocentrist has the better argument?

Perhaps neither one, we think, for these are both relative
wants and there is no external source of justification
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for such wants.

Their claims are really no
different fro.
the claims of other homocentrists
The farmland interest
may claim that if the development
interest has its way we
will run out of food in a decade.
While they may be right,
no good grounds appear to exist
for their position.
Consider that developers must suffer the
same consequences as
the general population.
Do they really believe that they
.

must make

a

choice between developing land or having

enough food to eat?

No,

they more likely believe that if

they become rich enough through their enterprise
they will
be among the few who can afford to buy food
when it becomes

scarce.

These interrogations make it possible to observe
that the notion of the "environment" is simplistic and

misleading.

As long as ordinary people are made to think

that the environment is a commodity, an item capable of

being sliced and shared among participants in

a

social

order, then there can be such notions as optimal pollution,

because people and policy analysts will be able to think
in terms of "external diseconomies" or "externalities."

That is, they will think of social costs as commodity

values just as much as industrial producers think in
terms of the costs of production.

Both "costs" are on

an equal footing except that many individuals in the same

population are producers making rational decisions to
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profit from their activities, and, as
an aggregate, make
macro-decisions productive of such social
costs.

What's in

a

concept, we might ask?

did not think of the environment as

a

For if people

material place in

which they live, then they would not be able to
think of
it as a collection of items capable of being
divided up

among themselves.

They would, of necessity, think of it

as a part of the very meaning of themselves.

That they

do think of it as an external thing is manifestly what
is

meant by the bifurcation in consciousness.

First, human

subjecthood was cut off from nature objecthood, then the
very concept of subjecthood succumbed to the forces of

reification.

The interrogation brings this out clearly.

The problem Berry experiences throughout the

pages of his book reflects the problem of the bifurcation,
of the reified subject in whom all values are subjective.

Yet,

it will be questioned why the bifurcation concept

should be thought significant.

The atomistic subject of

industrial society is found to be the most efficient kind
of subject for the operation of the multiple dimensions
of production and service.

Berry's idea of agricultural

production is so profoundly at odds with the commodity
version of farming that one cannot help but draw the conclusion that two very different types of human being are
involved in these two kinds of activity.

Fundamentally,

.
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the industrial consumer is the
product of a complex language of advertising, market, money,
and profits leading

back to consumption.

The concept of work embedded in thi
s

abstract language follows abstract actions
of creating
markets and consumer demand. The concept of
work in
Berry's understanding of farming has nothing
in common

with the abstraction of consumption and creating
demand.
The interrelationship of worker and land meant
that the

human worker was defined by an activity which incorporated
that place into the life fabric.

Farmland turned to com-

modity production redefines the farmer as abstract producer, a part of the language of markets.

The significance

of the bifurcated consciousness can be drawn from these

observations

The significance of the bifurcation

When human consciousness encompasses only the social
world instead of the whole world of being, the eventual
result is

a

narrowing focus on human society as the only

area for human concern.

The view of many philosophers is

that anthropocentri sm describes this condition.

The argu-

ment already offered is that such philosophers have neg-

lected to notice how human selfhood changes along with

change in consciousness.

a

The analytical interrogation has

accordingly focused on the self and its meanings with
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respect to such changes.

Human-centeredness is therefore

an opaque idea because it can
indicate two or r.ore different
conditions of human consciousness.
With anthr5pos as the

center, it is fully possible to
recover an understanding
of the nonhuman world in terms of
its own meanings.

Granted
the obscurity of this statement, it
is one of the purposes
of this work to explain the idea.
With homos as the center
we have the totally familiar idea of
viewing the nonhuman

world from the standpoint of

a

social condition in which

the notion of a nonhuman subject is incoherent.

Thus we

view nonhumans as natural resources, as scientific
objects,
as useful objects,

or as pests.

The incoherence is a

function of the logic of the bifurcated consciousness.
The concept of work and this notion of an incoher-

ence together form elements of an explanation about the

significance of a bifurcated consciousness.
indicates far more than

a

mere splitting apart of society

a

and nature; it indicates

For the idea

a

certain kind of humanity forming

certain kind of social system, making impossible

of work that ties a human subject to

more or less timeless.

kind

place, a location

A built environment gives clues

as to its historical location,

or late 20th century.

a

a

say, medieval or modern

Land, relatively untouched, gives

no clue about the historical sense of any humanity in-

habiting it.

We indicate our historical sense of ourselves
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by the material environment we
create.

We become more or

less alienated from timeless places;
although many moderns
enjoy "the great outdoors," they
generally retreat again
back into the doors of time. Nature,

understood as

ahistorical and timeless, is the place of
timeless being,
the mute world.
Society, the context maker, the creator
of time,

formulates for its population the modes of action

and the kinds of work which help to stabilize
the contextual meanings supporting these very same action
orientations,
The bifurcation of consciousness indicates the loss
of a luminous intelligibility that wild nature held
for

some humans.

Scientific rationality only places

a

frame

of understanding over wild nature that brings the conscious-

ness of time to bear on the essentially timeless, thus

taking away the essence it would claim to capture.
At this point the interrogation runs into the

"so what?" question.

So what if consciousness has changed?

In terms of the question of consciousness a powerful answer
is available.

One place to begin to answer the challenge

is with the observed commonplace incoherence of everyday

experience.

Environmentalism

,

given social meaning, refers

to the qualities that many feel enhance a certain idea of
a

good life.

We moderns know what they are:

clean air;

unpolluted waterways, potable, good-tasting water; freedom
from crowding; freedom from excessive loud noise;
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esthetically pleasing cities and parks;
and, of course,
the ability to get out to the great
outdoors.
It is

just at such junctures that our conflicting

wants and desires show up.

For, as a social good, a com-

modity such as clean air must be weighed against
other,
economic goods.

Wants must also be balanced against wants.

But the concept of clean air is almost impossible
to sepa-

rate from a host of other concepts that refer to one
type
of world and not to another.

"World" itself refers to

formulators, or creators of it; so it is
of its beings and not a thing apart.

therefore be

a

a

manifestation

Clean air cannot

wanted good in the same sense in which

society chooses cameras or fast cars, or efficient cars

rather than efficient trains.

quality of being,

a

Rather, clean air is a

manifestation of

a

way of life.

Ask the average American if he or she wants clean
air; the answer will certainly be yes.

But ask if they

are willing to bear the higher costs involved and there

may very well be hesitation.

Then ask such Americans if

they would like to see an alternative technology, different
and fewer products, and a very different way of life;

their fear of change will come to the fore.

really do not want clean air.

Then they

Our homocentric environ-

mentalists, perhaps naively, believe that they can have
both ways, unlimited industrial growth with lower prices

it
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and environmental goods.

Perhaps they do not realize the

sweeping implication of wanting
clean air or clean beaches
or more rural countryside.
The incoherence of wanting environmental
goods

without seeking the social context that
fosters such
qualities as a matter of its own logic is
an incoherence
of social consciousness.

Accordingly, the social actors

do not understand the implication of the
contradictoriness
of their wants.

Such inner contradictions derive from

self-definition as

a

locus of preferences

a

(which themselves

are not rooted in a social modality consti tuative
of

individual meaning) where the true origin of these free-

floating preferences are difficult to trace.

function in

a

Preferences

commodity network to give the appearance of

freedom of choice, an illusion that stems from the dictates
of marketing techniques.

Voter preferences and individual

values function to lend support to the myth of democracy.
Bound up with the levers of

a

corporate controlled market,

the idea of choice, political, economic, social, or per-

sonal, grows out of the same myth of individual autonomy
in a democratic state.

The extreme pressures to orient

oneself toward the production choices made by the market
managers and the social pressures to orient oneself toward
the illusion of freedom lend support to the myth of the

individual as politically, economically, and morally

.
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autonomous
The point of this observational evidence
is to argue
that environmental understanding (or, if
you wish, ecological intelligence)

standing as

a

is a function of selfhood.

Human under-

component of human identity is the missing

element in most quests for epistemological certitude.
are what we know, and to know is to be.

We

To be a product

of the manipulated market is to accept the forms of ration-

ality congenial to the process or medium of economic determinants.

Such rationality can never grasp the concept of

self as a medium of relational benevolence toward the

world as subject.
The first stage of the bifurcation was the separa-

tion of the individual qua subject from the possibility
of relational understanding; and in this process the indi-

vidual became attached to

a

self-understanding as rational.

But this meant that the individual was dependent upon the

notion that only cognition taken as activity of the brain,
fully apart from the body's environment, determined what
one knew or could know.

In this subtle sense,

vidual became divorced from his/her own body.

the indiIn the

second stage of the bifurcation, the individual as knower
was open to any cognitive environment; and, for reasons

that must be omitted here, that environment became the

commodity network by which the individual became an object.
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In a commodity network there
may be no good way to

distinguish between humans and things,
and, therefore,
between nonhumans and things.
In this network, human
social
relations take the form of techniques
for economic effi-

ciency, and thus embody forms of
exploitation.

As exploi-

tative methods are used on nonhuman
life as an approach
legitimated by public policies,
the idea of exploitation
is taken to be a perfectly normal
operation of society.
What should be observed about the total
context in which
this social method takes place is the
transformation
of

key concepts which in one form or another have
guided many

kinds of human existence.

Most notable is the concept of

an "end" toward which becoming is to be oriented.

In the

commodity network the end of life is to serve this gigantic abstraction.
be,

There is no other end, nothing we should

other than servants of this process.
The import of this view, homocentric self and

social relations as a recent phenomenon, is how the problem
of morality flows out of this condition.

In this homo-

centric form the problem of morality appears to be pro-

foundly more unsolvable than most social theorists have
thought, even as they considered it in more benign terms.

There are two parts to this problem, although hardly

noticed as having two parts or dimensions.

The human/nature

controversy in its contemporary form deals with "environ-

:

43

mental ethics," and takes

a

question such as the following

as being both intelligible and
answerable:

owe any duties to wild nature?

do we (humans)

The second part suggests

how an answer could be made to the first:

the problems

and controversies regarding our moral history,
human pos-

tures no longer tenable— such as Kant's
unconditional

ought— and

the meaning of these disintegrations.

Somewhat

naively, perhaps, it could be asked how, if our moral tra-

ditions have collapsed, can we have obligations to nonhuman
life when we seem to have lost our sense of obligation to

each other?

Alasdair Maclntyre, having recently traced

this history, seems at a loss as to how to recover the

human subject who would embody moral qualities.

Maclntyre

remarks that
We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we
continue to use many of the key expressions.
But
we have— very largely, if not entirely
lost our
comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of
morality 1^
.

.

.

—

.

The explanation given here for this loss of compre-

hension moves on
lntyre

's

different level of theorizing.

a

Mac-

analysis, taking the form of an historical argu-

ment, traces the disintegrations of moral traditions and

their cohesiveness

.

The present inquiry, abstracting

from history, conceptualizes the homocentrist to be the
logical outcome of these disintegrations, and thereby
the maker of an amoral, object-oriented, society.
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Homocentrism, as an explanation
of this descript ion
of what moderns have become,
brings to the

idea of the indi-

vidual qua social atom

a

further idea which illuminates
the

problem of appearance without
substance.

The bifurcation

of consciousness could not long
endure in the form of an

autonomous human subject because the
splitting apart of the
subject from wild nature as subject
meant the
end of

anthropos, the end of human existence
interconnected with
the means of knowing oneself as an
essence.
The point
is that when the community of ideas
and the social understanding as part of these gave way, the individual
as

subject gave way with it.

The path to the ob jec tif ication

of the individual and society was cleared.

This conceptual schema concerning the significance
of the bifurcation brings us to see that a simple
dichot-

omy between the individual and community leads to

understanding of the problem.

a

false

That problem, once again,

is the argument between certain environmentalists

(who are

also preservationists) and the rest of society about

whether there is something fundamentally wrong with our
system of ideas and beliefs.

represents

a

If homocentric consciousness

problem, then that problem is essentially

moral in nature.

The path to social objectif ication was

made by numerous contributions to our self-understanding.

Significant was the idea of the social contract and its
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implications for the concept of morality.

Perhaps an argu-

ment by exemplification will bring out the point.
If our moral language is about contracts, about

such things as not taking unfair advantage of another person, or not stealing, then people are vulnerable to attack
by other people; although, with respect to a tacit under-

standing, we do not do such things because we want to live
in peace.

Of course those, such as animals, who are not

party to the contract, are vulnerable to attack by people.
As an aside,

it would be irrelevant for one to counter

that animals live in a world of predation where one species

attacks another.

It is irrelevant because this is a world

of homeostasis where the good of the community of beings
is

served by the sacrifice of some individuals to others.

It can be argued that contractual

schemes are the human

way of producing harmony in a human com.munity.

Nonetheless,

this comparison misses the idea about what happens to our

moral understanding in a contractual social scheme.

The

sense of the individual as embodying moral precepts gives
way to an individual motivated to act (or react) in re-

sponse to multiple levers and social controls.

The indi-

vidual no longer asks:

what is the good toward which

should direct my life?

Instead, the individual asks:

can

I

best live my life so that

I

I

how

am caused the minimum of

harm and realize the most satisfaction?
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The shift is not from the communal
good (or the

good of the state) to the good of the
individual; rather,
it is a shift from individual

self-understanding as

subject and carrier of moral ideals shared with

a

community

a

(and as will be afgued later, produced by that
community)
to an increasingly isolated social actor who
becomes de-

tached from purposive contexts bearing some moral ideal.
In consequence, all aspects of life, human and nonhuman,

lying beyond immediate wants, needs, and desires of indi-

viduals, produce an inner response equivalent to

a

"dis-

tancing" of oneself from immediacy, from existential
judgements, and from occasions not of personal concern.
Note well the modern origin of the word "personal," which

attaches to "private," suggesting onion-like layers of

being leading to an inner core akin to

a void.

That wonderfully ambiguous word "privacy," so

closely related to the "personal," is becoming obsolete.
For, as has been noted many times in the literature on

technocracy, when there is nothing but the private life,
the word loses its potency from lack of contrast.

Indi-

viduals in mass society are increasingly led to embrace

privacy through the proliferation of electronic gadgetry

which in turn narrows their consciousness further, making
them less and less aware of an outside world as in any

significant way related to their personal lives.

Homo-
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centrism, then, might be described
as

a

sociaily created

consciousness in which people have largely
lost consciousness of themselves as meaningfully
connected to the wider
world.

And with this break in connectedness
is

in moral inders tanding
It

,

a

a

break

break with agency qua subject.

should be pointed out that this schema does

not arise from

a

"romanticism" or nostalgia for

a

mythical

past imagined to be somehow better than the
present.

Rather, the concern here is with
that could, in

a

a

form of consciousness

logical sense, reappear once again.

For

this reappearance of ecocentric consciousness is the whole

thrust of this work.
The meaning of the bifurcation has been explained
as a reduction or truncation of humanity; and it was argued

that the reduction was moral in nature.

Then we made some

headway toward explaining the concept of morality as

component of consciousness.
a

a

This effort continues with

model of humanity conscious of itself in terms of key

ideas about moral existence.

"Land," "self," and "partici-

pation" should be understood relational ly

.

In the follow-

ing sketch it should be kept in mind that certain features
of nonmodern life do not apply to the present,

but certain

features are fundamental to moral consciousness in any
time or place.
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Ecocentrism:

a

definition

Contemporary Amerindians in various parts
of the
U.S. explain that the reason they
were involved

in lawsuits

with government to regain access and control
of large

parcels of land is because they are
and the land is

a

part of them.

part of the land

a

What they mean is that

the Indian self is created in a language that
is largely

about the self making

living from the land.

a

The self's

identity is created from language and action that is v^holly
out of place apart from the land.
an Indian without a self.

A displaced Indian is

One could adduce the high rate

of Indian suicides to this kind of loss.

The self derives

its meaning from the land and the land takes its meaning

from the nature of the Indian self.

The presence of non-

human subjects in Indian languages sounds fitting to modern

ecocentrists

.

The Amerindians' relation in consciousness to the

land is understood in terms of language and action.

selves are bound up with a place where

a

"living" is made.

A "living" here refers to a unity through which

coheres, through which

a

Their

a

self

life has a meaning in relation

to a place inhabited by ancestors.

The scientific ecolo-

gist has two words to explain the meaning of making a

.
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living.

In the words of Paul Colinvaux,
a
•

'niche' is more than just a physical
place:
the grand scheme of things.
The
an animal's (or a plant's) profession,

^^
It IS a: place

nicheis

m

wolf-spider is

everything it does
to get Its
? °f
food and raise its babies.
To be able to
do these things it must relate properly
to the place
where it lives and to other inhabitants
of that
place.
Everything the species does to survive and
stay tit
the Darwinian sense is its niche.
The physical living space in an ecologist's
jargon is called the habitat
The habitat is the
address' or location in which individuals of a
species live.
The woodland floor hunted by wolfspiders is the habitat, but wolf -spidering is their
niche. lo
''^^

m

.

The Indian's land, habitat, and niche provide the

very possibility for self -identi ty

.

Just as without

habitat there could be no wolf -spidering

,

a

so the Indian's

total way of life is not possible without his land.

There is no difficulty in stating that language,
thought, and action manifest the self; the difficulty

arises when one attempts to depict language use and to

examine it for indications of purposive behavior, since

purpose can be understood in multiple ways quite apart
from simple goal-directed actions.

Returning to the above

example will illustrate this difficulty and how it may be

overcome
To argue that Indian and land are one is to

state the thesis that the Indian self is realized in the

matrix created by making an Indian-living, analogous to
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wolf-spidering.

Language, thought, and action
crystall:IZG

to form a self.

If the Indian is then forced
from his

land and, say, given a place to live
in Sioux City, Iowa
(complete with a government subsidy), that
self is de-

stroyed.

Realization of self by way of

a

relation to the

"land" can justifiably be called ecocentrism.

Indian to sell the land (as if it were
is

to sell his self

a

For an

piece of property)

(as if it could be transferred).

The sense in which a self is realized is the sense
in which a purpose is realized.

Purpose here means some-

thing different from short run rationalized purposes, but
is rather attached to the concept of an end.

In this

sense we can say that a purpose is an orientation.

reflects

a

people's orientation.

Language

One cannot confuse the

orientation of

a

Karam villager in New Guinea with the

orientation of

a

Wall Street broker; we cannot say that

their purposes are at all comparable, or that they both

have purpose in the same sense.

The relational concept

is illustrated by showing that the language of the Karam

people attaches to objects that are ends in themselves.

Their orientation could be depicted through an analysis of
their language.

By further investigation, one can know

something about their end-purpose, the

sura

total of their

actions, although it may not be possible to experience
the "meaning" of those purposive behaviors because an

.
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inquirer is not

a

Karam self.

Still, there is but one ecocentrism
and its relational language can be recognized by
other ecocentrists

Other things being equal, ecocentric
selfhood is one type
of consciousness which superficial
differences

in cultures

cannot obviate.

In order to say that the ecocentric
self

is a human type to be found in different
times and places,

it must be possible to identify the general
characteristics

which constitute this self.

The constituents of relational

selfhood are the moral characteristics.

The "land ethic"

is an expression for the thriving relational self.

The relational self
The relational self is a concept about persons in
an ecocentric community.

The relational self can also be

found in anthropocentric communities in which people share
a

common destiny.

moral ideal.

In this case,

In the former case,

belongs to the concept of

a

the common bond is a

ecological obligation

relational self.

We will refer

here only to the former concept of the self.
To speak of this relation is already to lay the

basis for an elaborating of the idea of

a

land ethic.

The

meaning of the relational self can only be grasped in terms
of the component concepts of communal ends,

the moral

nature of land, and the nonhuman inhabitants of the

.
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communi ty

The moral concept of land
Land, in our moral conception, is
an aspect of the

self.

Land means an internalization of all
the Earth's

inhabitants, including aquatic species, and their
ways
of life.

Person, Land, and Species is the relational
triad

which is our sense of community.
land,

Our moral concept of

then, is precisely this relational self, a bonding

or unifying consciousness.

Now if land meant only cultivated land, then the

whole idea of

a

bond would be spurious and

a

person's

attachment to land would be either instrumental or sentimental or both.

For the ecocentrist, land is something

to which one belongs, not something which belongs to some-

one.

If there is nominal ownership it is a practical

convenience regarding individual responsibility for
place.

Wild land or wilderness is also

one belongs.

a

a

place to which

Clearly not all land can be wild and still

support modern human life, but

a

certain wilderness is

essential to the ecocentric relation.

Preservation here

means the preservation of the relational self because in

concept it is not distinguishable from the land and its

inhabitants; there is
speaking, we have here

common destiny.

a
a

In a manner of

rather different kind of self-

.
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preservation.

That is, individual needs are
understood

only in terms of the triad.
is a place,

a

The concept of land, then,

habitat, a community,

how we seek to view it.

a

bond, depending on

In each case there is a moral

relation
Clearly, we are discussing the self rather than

ecological practices as such.

The ecocentric community

was shown to be oriented toward the preservation of
the

relational triad, which in practical terms issues in dimensions of action.

One such dimension is to use ecological

knowledge to care for wilderness; in another dimension,
wise cultivation practices are called for; in still another, there are ways to use urban land so that it does not

become an industrial sewer.

These actions need not be

specified in detail since the question of the relational
self in action goes beyond the present discussion.''"''
The concepts of homocentrism and ecocentrism have

been set out, showing why there is no moral relation between

human and land, or between human and nonhuman

,

or (in the

sense we have explained) even between human and human.
The bedrock of being, which was discussed in the beginning
of this chapter, has now been defined.

The triad is the

universal element in all human thinking that is properly
called moral.

Although the word "moral" would seem to

be contestable in homocentric society,

its sense in prac-

tical ter.s is limited to a
variety of incoherent codes
of behavior which, in each
domain, supply the directions
for conduct appropriate to
homocentrism.
The most crucial idea expressed
by the thesis now
propounded is the epistemological
mythology propagated by

homocentric society.

It makes a distinction
between

"practical" knowledge and pure or
theoretical knowledge.
True, this view would seem to have
come from Aristotle;
however, the interpretation is couched
in homocentric
language.
Thus, homocentrists can make a
distinction
between fact and value because they take
these words to

have demonstrable meaning and because they
have split their
world into a realm of objectivity and one of
relativism.
In this way any member of society in the
western countries

can hold any view desired since, in a deep sense,
all are

ultimately homogenized into the same view.
One must be extremely careful here.

In the kind

of society described earlier as a generalized Amerindian

society, it could not be said that its members (in any

given tribe) held or wished to hold differing beliefs.
Yet, we would be misled to think that this too was a form
of homogenized thought and action.

will be an indirect one.

between
a

a

The argument for this

In essence,

the difference is

social system in which commodity production,

ruling idea, governs social behavior, and

a

form of
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life in which individuals derive
meaning, sense, and
purpose from their existential
context.
Individual s are

interconnected in their understanding
of their lives.
In
homocentric society, individuals are
disconnected but are
obliged to conform to external modes
of conduct that have

only extrinsic import for their lives.
The critical edge to our conceptual
elaboration

comes to this.

The homocentrist

,

according to contempo-

rary notions, is an autonomous individual
even while he
lives in a bureaucratic society.
But it is not bureau-

cratic society as such that creates

a

problem for the

individual; rather, it is the idea that something called
"moral knowledge" should play a part in everyday life.

Homocentrists

,

being devoid of the triadic relation, gain

an understanding of themselves by being directed and

invented.

The technos tructure shapes consciousness;

as requisites of a human community disappear,

so too does

the relation to place, a defined quality of a people.

Preview and Summary

The thesis is now stated in all of its essentials.
The next two chapters will deal with two aspects of the

moral problem.

First, the question of ecological obliga-

tion is addressed in terms of the homocentric-ecocentric
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tension.

The point to emerge fror.
chapter two is that
in
the forr. of objective knowledge,
moral reasoning leads to
paradoxes or to precepts that are less
than compelling when
the moral question concerns nonhuman
life.
The conclusion
is drawn that discursive argument
about what society ought

to do about animals and wild places
is an incoherent ques-

tion when the purposes of homocentric
society are considered.
Second, the question intimated in chapter
one is

taken up in chapter two.

If purely rational-discursive

ideas about human obligations to nature fail to
offer any

solution to the problem of extinction and the problem
of
cruelty, what is the real nature of the problem, and how

should it be dealt with?

problem be avoided?
theory based on

a

wants and desires.

Better still, how could the

The answer is a revision of social

new psychology of the nature of human
This revisionary thesis is continued

in chapter three in the same interrogatory fashion, prob-

ing the ideas and reasons of homocentric thinking.

Ego-

ism, or "enlightened" egoism, is a product of homocentric

social arrangements; then the interrogation must require
some other form of thinking, some other basis for revising
the theory of society.

In chapter four,

the problem is

explored in terms of the concerns, warnings, and fears of
political ecologists.

All along, the problem has been

the question of a revision of homocentric thinking, and
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why such a revision is crucial.

The reader should not

expect in these pages to find any
discussion about environmental theory except as it is intimately
related to the
single concern of this work:
the problem of selfhood.
The revision of consciousness entails
the theory
of the sustainable society.

This version of society is

a

product of

a

product of another human type.

a

type of selfhood just as homocentrism is
Thus, the denouement

of this work is reached at the end of chapter
three.

Chapter four deals with the contemporary confusion concerning problems most serious thinkers consider major.
The results of the interrogation are applied to the dis-

cussions found in this literature.
In sum,

obligation.

the thesis is a new version of ecological

It says that moral

ideas are so intimately

bound up with the idea of selfhood that no intellectual
ethic propounded from within homocentric society can ever
have the sense of

existence.

Such

a
a

meaning and purpose for human social
purposeful existence depends on

close relation between human and nonhuman nature.

a

There-

fore, human morality is integral to ecological thinking.

CHAPTER

II

RELATIONAL OR THE DISRELATIONAL
SELF?

The Problem of Rational and Moral
Thinking

Western European thought for the last
several centuries has involved a question about
the rational
way to

arrive at an ethic which would be both
logically consistent
and socially accepted.
After the foundations of rationalist thought crumbled, there seemed to be no
rational edi-

fice that would support the various claims of
reason based
on the supposition of human supremacy.

This latter notion

was, however, very old, having defenders long before

Porphyry.

But an idea which grew out of this, a more

recent idea, concerns
ness.

a

narrow version of human conscious-

The idea, of course, is egoism.

Versions of the

social contract, in which competing egos form

a

rational

order capable of accommodating the wants and needs of all,

restricted the sense in which ethical relations could

intelligibly be discussed.
For reasons now made clear, the focus of ideas in
recent history centered progressively on

a

human-centered

society, one, it was argued, that contained the seeds of
58
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homocentrism.

The effort in this chapter
is to .ake a
complex move that proceeds on two
levels, both with the
aim of refining an epistemic theory
grounded in a concept
of the self.
Instead of a merely

cognitive-rational

approach to the problem of-morality,

a

reconceptualization

of the problem is made by interrogating
the relation of

human society to wild nature.

Toward this end, the purely

intellectual idea of an "animal rights" ethic is
contrasted
with the concept of a relational community.
It
will be-

come clear why an ethic toward animals that belongs
to
an ideology integral to homocentrism

fails

to address the

problem.

Consistent with the claim that anthropos is the
model for any possible development of the ecocentric outlook, it would be profitable to turn to the Aristotelian

idea of community.

In Aristotle, one finds the type of

man (not woman) whose sense of community is decidedly

hierarchical and closed, yet importantly relational.

The

self's relation to the community orients it to certain
social ends.

The final goal of human action in community

is the good both of the community and the individual.

The potentiality of the individual can only be realized
in community, not apart from it.

The relation itself

constituted the possibility for moral or intellectual
virtue.

One finds, however, that Aristotle's community

s

9

.

s

is an artificial construct
that was bound to disappear,

taking with it the relational
morality.

It

is not the

virtues, but the relation which made
the virtues possible
that is the importance of Aristotle's
model of Greek
communi ty

The anthropocentric relational self
The history of the self or consciousness does
not

concern us here; only the eventual disintegration
of the
relational self concerns us.
then,

The inevitable question,

is why did the relational

structure which held moral

consciousness together finally fail?
It has often been said that the exclusion of women

and slaves from the quest for virtue formed some part of
an answer to why the experiment failed, whereas very little

attention has been paid to the anthropocentri sm and its
moral context.

In fact, much of what is taken for essen-

tial ingredients of excellence or virtue is embedded in

this anthropocentric consciousness.

For instance, Aristotle

tells us that the aim of ethical study is not knowledge
but

(rational) action.

of praxi

mals.

20

within

1

Accordingly, the Greek concept

is confined to rational man and excludes ani-

The very idea of moral excellence takes place
a

hierarchy of being, with man

21

in the pol

i

the top, and the man of moral wisdom at the pinnacle.

near

61

Human excellence is the ability
to engage in rational and
moral activity, but the rationality
of moral activity is
prescribed to fit the Greek image of
man as the highest
realization of animal life. Aristotle
says in the Metaphysics
All things are ordered together somehow,
but
alike--both fishes and fowls and plants; and not all
the world
IS not such that one thing has nothing
to do with
another, but they are connected.
In order to have a hierarchy, the forms of
life must cul-

minate with the ideal, and what is ideal can only
be few
in number.

The relation, then, is not a relation in com-

munity amongst equals.

In this scheme there could be no

sense of common destiny between man in community and animal
life, certainly not in a moral sense.

John Rodman points out that Pythagoras and Empedocles

"...

exhibited in both theory and practice

a

deep

sense of the kinship of human and nonhuman (especially

animal) life." 2 3

Aristotle would not have seen "kinship"

in the orderly connectedness of things.

For him, moral

life is reserved for rational beings alone.

The rational

life of man in community, then, is an exclusive sort of

relation, and it would have seemed odd to Aristotle to
include nonhuman life in
In effect,

a

moral perspective.

the contemporary quest for an environ-

mental morality is an attempt to undo the work of two
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millennia.

But it seems particularly strange
that, with

the widospread recognition that
all moral ideas ultimately
fail, some philosophers should still
seek an ethic con-

cerning not just humans but the
environment or nonhuman
life

.

In this era of high technology, many
people sense

that we are locked into a dead-end, and so
want to revise

our course, believing that
If it

is,

a

different world is possible.

we are moving beyond the idea of mere social

change; we are instead talking about
tion of consciousness.
clear.

a

fundamental altera-

This much we have already made

Less clear is how we are to conceive an environ-

mental morality which alters consciousness.

It

should be

pointed out that the ecocentric relational conception of

morality is obscure because the bifurcated consciousness
is

the historically dominant one.

It would be well

to

bracket this concept of ecocentrism temporarily in order
to more fully discuss the idea of an environmental ethic

as it appears superficially.

Some philosophers have noted

between

a

a

possible distinction

morality that is about the environment and one

that stems from or is derived from it.

To date there have

been few contributions to the latter idea, primarily

because no compelling "ought" has been found.

Indeed,

what would compel the di srelational self to suddenly
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follow "nature" or

a

set of ecological principles?

Since the discovery that moral oughts
have no
foundation, modern individualists hit
upon the idea that

although there may not be

Somehow

a

a

moral good, there are "rights."

"natural right" could never be philosophically

established so it is not clear in what sense
there are
rights.
Among the contemporary theorists who

attempt to

explain what

right is and who has it, some ethical

a

theorists have decided that animals are among the holders
of rights.

No one has yet established from where these

rights came.

Although the language of contracts continues

to pervade our moral discourse,

such quasi-legal ideas

are suitable only in light of

self -definition which

a

discovers its validation in the process of being directed
from without.
one,

According to the premise set out in chapter

the idea of an animal rights ethic is a logical

outcome of homocentrism

.

Drawing on its version of egali-

tarian democracy, animal rights theorists seem to feel
that homocentric society can readily understand such ideas

and incorporate them.
(of any kind),

But if animals are granted rights

the implications of this for human society

need to be spelled out.
What is being examined here is

a

variation of the

ontological conflict between homocentrism and varieties
of ecocentrism.

The animal rights thesis, based on
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hcocentrls™, will be confronted
by ecocentrlc relational
being.

First, the problem of
anthropocentrlc relational
being must be set out.

The anth ropocentric relational
sel

f

The diagram in chapter one
depicted on the horizontal line the anthropocentric
stage of human and nonhuman
nature.
A certain human-centeredness
did not preclude it

being ordered together with nonhuman
life.

The fact that

some Greeks spoke about a hierarchy
of being does not
change the main consideration that
human and nonhuman nature
were conceived to be on one plane or
continuum of being.
The bifurcation of the line indicated
that nonhuman sub-

jects had disappeared, and that only the
human subject
qua person remained, at least for a time.

Finally the subject "human" falls back on
plane and the object "nature" also falls back on
plane.

a
a

new

new

Whereas, on the original horizontal plane, the

subject was invented, thereby making possible the idea that
beings were subjects and later that some subjects had
more status than others, it was not until the bifurcation
that some subjects became things or objects while others

remained subjects.

How could this distinction be main-

tained in consciousness indefinitely?

finally to fall back on

a

Consciousness had

new plane such that the

65

distinction vanished.
We know that the bifurcation
rendered nonhumans

into objects, but how could humans
remain subjects?

The

distinction is an artificial one which
consciousness could
not forbear.

The anthropocentrist viewed all
things as

connected somehow; now this no longer
held true.
The
idea of connectedness was that some
subjects qua persons
could attain a knowledge or insight into
the workings of
things of which they themselves formed
some
part.

If,

now,

the self forms no part of the things it tries
to know,

but is wholly separable and apart, then the
self stands

apart from all other life as if it had come full-blown
into a world, and tries to know the other world as objects

which function entirely by

a

different set of principles.

Only if all things are connected somehow could the world
of subjects be sustained.
it begins

Once living objects are created,

to appear inevitable that the distinction will

fail and all life will become object life.

Aristotle had to reconcile his view that "all
things are ordered together somehow" with his conception
of the moral situation.

The moral dimension of human life

could be realized only within the construct of
as a relation.

human life.

a

community

Morality could not be involved with non-

Whereas there is an ontological connection

between human and nonhuman life, it is only in the human

.

community that the depth of
known.

a

man's character could be

This is the human-centered element.

This anthropocentrism is found in
the understanding
that although there was a certain
aristocracy of virtue in

Aristotle's community, there was also
human worth.

a

recognition of

For though it is true that slaves qua
slaves

were instruments, slaves qua men were also
the subjects of
justice.

24

To speak precisely, the slave qua man was
not

an object but rather

scheme of things.

a

subordinate subject in tne moral

This contrasts sharply with the democ-

racy of thinghood we have come to know as homocentrism
What we are driving at, however, is that although animals
were regarded by Aristotle as still more subordinate, they
too were a part of being.

The idea is that there are

gradations of being in nature which

"

.

,

.

in most of

the other animals can be discerned traces of the psycho-

logical modes which attain their clearest differentiation
in man."

25

We can now see the subject in an anthropo-

centric perspective.
What can we conclude about Aristotle's conception
of the anthropocentric relational self?

We can say that

its pursuits were closely connected with the good of the

community of rational and social members.
inherently moral, being devoted to

a

at the mutual good of the community.

The self was

life of actions aimed

There was nothing
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simple about this quest,
since there could be
tragic conflicts of good with good,
but this point need not
concern
us.
The rational life was only
possible in co..unity, and
rational action was the pursuit
of the good.
This relational morality was genuine
because it constituted an ethos
and formed a way of life.
The interest we have in this

Aristotelian vision is just this
relational morality or
community since it is the model for
a

new relational moral-

ity.

However, since its theoretical basis
is anthropocentric, the need here is for a further
theory which would
allow a transition to ecocentric ideas.
The anthropocentrism of Aristotelian community meant in
moral terms that
since the "lower" forms existed for the
sake of "higher"
forms, moral action could not be directed
"downward."

There could be no moral reason for saving species
had there

been endangered species.

The relational self aimed only

"upward."
In our contemporary world of mass societies it is

very difficult to imagine being in relation to

a

community,

and far more difficult to imagine being in relation to

wild land and the inhabitants of that land.

It would seem

that the relational self has disapppeared forever, but
this is not fully the case.

The ontological tension

brought out in this work points to the idea that

a

sus-

tainable society based on ecocentric thinking is

a

real

.
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threat to homocentri sm

The disrelational self
In chapter one homocentric
environmental concerns

were said to be manifest in occasional
preferences for certain kinds of goods in terms of
others.
It is now time
to look at the disrelational self
in conjunction with the
notion of an environmental ethic. From
what has been so
far argued, it is clear that the
homocentric disrelational
self embodies a rationality fundamentally
inconsistent with
environmental thinking, and therefore inconsistent
with
the moral tradition outside of social contract
ideas.

Who is the disrelational self?

discourse it is clearly

a

From homocentric

language about such things as

security, rights, benefits, and contracts, but who is the

person wanting these things?

Let us put it another way.

What is the identity of the self we call "disrelational"?

Maclntyre contrasts Goffman's view that there is
no "true self" beyond the separate roles being played with

Sartre's view that
its social roles.

26

a

moral self exists wholly apart from
We mention this to bring out how the

whole controversy about the nature of the self and its
moral meaning is mistaken.

Goffman thinks that there is

no such thing as moral language apart from the social

institutions in which the self operates.

2 7

Contrarily,

It should be brought out
how odd It is to hold
the view

that

true or "authentic" self
could exist apart fro™
a moral context made
by such a being.
Both Goff™an and
Sartre seem to presuppose an
individualistic entity whose
a

person is either reflected in the
sum of its social roles
or in its authenticity.
In the latter case, Maclntyre
remarks that

Sartre's account provides a space
within which only
one new virtue can be practiced.
For
consists precisely in the self making authenticity
its words and
"^"'^^^^ ^^^y
virtue has
tttLl'f'/^'
nothing
to do anymore with the content of
action
but only with its relationship to
the self. 28

Outside of
import.

chimera.
It

is

a

moral context, words and deeds have no
moral

Sartre's version of the authentic self is

a

Both writers have assumed the disrelational
self

important to see that neither of these versions

tells us anything about the self in community, the
context
of moral action.
In this brief discussion of the problem it may

seem that Goffman does include, in fact insists upon,
such a context.

But this is an illusion, for the disre-

lational self never realizes anything like
for its actions.

a

moral context

The bureaucratic maze in which the dis-

relational self finds itself permits only social codes,
not a morality rooted in the self's being.

would seem to require both

a

self and

a

"True morality

relational context
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But social roles are merely
accidental; one could play
an entirely different set of
roles.
If such roles create
the self, then the self is no more
than the sum of its
social roles, and these could not
produce a morality of
the self.

Relational selfhood is taken here to be
the only
possibility for morality. No other version
of the self

seems to give a convincing account of how
ity arises.

a

genuine moral-

Since the "authentic self" is not bound up

with an ontologically purposive existence, its
purpose or

meaning as an authentic self is difficult to discover.
The extreme disrelation of this version of the self shows
as much emptiness as does Goffman's own version.

In con-

trast, it was argued that moral purpose depends on moral

contexts as ends in themselves.
a

The self's relation to

moral context is absolutely essential for the coherence

of its action.

Without context, the di srelational self's

connection with "duties" or "obligations" lacks all conviction, except perhaps as part of

a

subjective feeling

which has no objective reference for others.
Amidst this moral vacuity it is wholly illogical
to find people talking about an environmental ethic.

Clearly, when they do so they merely mean
sonal" preferences and not

a

a

set of "per-

genuine morality.

For

instance we find one biologist saying that "However deeply
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and sincerely you may believe in
an environmental ethic,
you cannot in a pluralistic democracy
overrule public
values for what you deem to be the
good of the public. "29

This interpretation of an environmental
ethic

mirrors

a

widespread interpretation of morality
generally.

It is

said that a person's preferences for
certain moral
choices may clash with those of other persons;
but this
is

inevitable when moral concepts reflect only the
emotions

of attraction and aversion.
no objective basis.

Beyond this, a morality has

Hence, an ethic toward the environ-

ment necessarily reflects

a

personal preference based on

someone's emotional characteristics.
If objective and impersonal moral standards cannot

be rationally justified,

then is it not misguided to speak

of a morality encompassing nonhuman elements of the world?

Certainly it would be difficult or impossible to justify
a

principle of responsibility or of obligation toward the

environment.

Who would willingly follow such principles?

There are of course simulacra of morality, for instance
codes of ethics, such as "business ethics," in which stan-

dards of conduct are erected essentially by fiat.

environmental ethic meant nothing more than

a

If an

code of

conduct toward the environment, few people would comply
with it consistently.

A deontological ethic toward or

about the environm.ent is an unsatisfactory idea because
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it is not clear what
sense of purpose would
direct homo-

centric society to treat the
environment in a certain way.
If homocentrists often
behave toward the environment
so
as to endanger their own
health or safety, how much more
far-fetched is it to ask them to
act so as to safeguard the
well-being of nonhuman life simply
for its own sake?

So it seems wildly absurd to
speak about an envir-

onmental ethic which, as one contemporary
ethicist, Tom
Regan, tells us, must follow two conditions:
(1) An environmental ethic must hold that
nonhuman beings which have moral standing there are
(2) An environmental ethic must hold that
the class
ot those beings which have moral standing
includes
but IS larger than the class of conscious
beings—
that IS, all conscious beings and some
nonconscious
beings must be held to have moral standing. 30

It seems that by a simple instrumental measure
of

human good we cannot act morally toward animals.

That is,

if an animal dead benefits some humans without positive

harm to others, then there is no reason not to slaughter
the animal.

Who then would follow an environmental ethic?

There are people who say that we ought to be "kind" to

animals or to treat them humanely.
do this?
of things?

How does such

a

But why ought we to

moral ought conform to any scheme

Consciousness bifurcated has left our sense

of the animal world obscure, and talk of an environmental

ethic is equally obscure.

Why should we not behave

morally toward plants, or even toward water or stones?
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And although there are some
principles which scientists
might agree upon about what is
beneficial for a given
ecosystem, such knowledge would not
alone compel action.
Finding no purpose other than what
might be considered

personally fulfilling, the di srelational
self has no motive
for holding an environmental ethic
in Regan's
sense.

It

is plain that environmental
preferences for amenities such

as parks,

clean beaches, campgrounds, and the like
are

common instances of homocentric wants, but that
such wants
are distinct from an environmental ethic.
To conclude,

it is almost impossible to say what

the connection is between the di srelational self and
an

environmental ethic in the homocentric context.

The lack

of connection may be owing to the concerns of the disrela-

tional self for the satisfaction of its own wants on

cost-benefit terms alone.

It

is

in this light that many

environmental ethicists appear to believe that
toward the environment is an unreachable goal.

a

morality
In lieu

of this, a number of theorists have posited the idea of

rights for animals.

Rights usually are the product of his-

toric agreements and are quasi-legal ideas.

The circle

of rights holders was originally very narrow; contemporary

currents have widened the circle so that aliens, infants,
the elderly, children,

the insane, perhaps even fetuses,

become holders of rights.

With this widening of the human

.
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circle, some ethicists urge that
the "human bias" be
abandoned to admit animals, and
perhaps also plants and
land areas, to the circle, so that
humans might represent
a forest as a holder of rights.
The widening of this

circle to all kinds of rights, including
the right of a
forest not to be cut down, admits law
into an ostensibly
moral discussion.
In traversing the conceptual distance
from the

idea of a moral community to this idea of
rights holders
we have largely lost sight of an environmental
ethic.
In place of the concept of moral goodness in
a community

we have the concept of benefits for classes of entities.

Given the standard conflicts between human instrumental
interests and basic animal interests in

a

homocentric

society, animals will be denied their basic interests,

including their basic interest in survival.

If we con-

tinue to press the rights for animals argument, we will
see that both an environmental ethic and the argument in

defense of animals are lost.

Let us see how this comes

about
If all people aim at benefitting themselves,

they will not aim at benefitting others except as

product of satisfying their own desires.

It

a

then

by-

is not

obvious that benefitting some animals for the animals'
own sake

v\7ill

in turn be beneficial,

although it is
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obvious that animals serve instrumental
interests.
Animals
can satisfy human wants, although some
of the wants or
interests they can satisfy are trivial or
nonbasic.
Animals will most often be denied their basic
interests,

including their basic interest in well-being.

We can see

that if animals are denied their basic interests,
they

will also be denied rights or will not be recognized
as

holders of rights.
Suppose, however, that wild animals are suddenly

recognized as holders of rights, meaning of course that
individual animals, not just species as
holders of rights.

a whole,

could be

Then they would be granted interests

so that all animals recognized as having rights,

say

zebras rather thean salamanders, would no longer be used
to serve instrumental interests.

Think of the implications.

In effect, wild animals would no longer have any use value.

The concept of benefits would be so altered that many con-

ceivable uses for animals would be eliminated.

The produc-

tion and distribution of coats made from wild animal fur,
for instance, would come to

a

halt.

Notice that among the

vast changes entailed in human behavior would be

a

respect

for wildlife habitat; land, such as forests, would have
to be treated so as to benefit all of its inhabitants.

Large scale development could not take place and the

number of homes would be severely limited as more people

.
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would be pushed back to the cities
where they would 1 ive
in gigantic highrises.
One implication of giving
right:
:s
to animals is that humans would
have to limit their numbers.
The changes in human society would
be
vast.

Clearly, from the homocentrists

'

point of view,

this kind of hypothetical situation
would not come about.
Most people would not want to be deprived
of the goods

and services which animals provide, and,
from

homocentric

a

perspective, the question of sacrificing for animals
does
not even arise.
The defense of nonhuman life must take place in
a

different dimension of argument.

It must be seen that

the disrelational self, that is, the homocentrist

,

is

in-

capable of holding to an ethic toward the environment.
If there is

to be an environmental ethic in which nonhu-

mans have moral standing, then there must be

a

relational

quality of the self that is capable of desiring the wellbeing of human and nonhuman alike.

This question of a

relational self therefore deserves closer scrutiny, but
this time the anthropocentri sm which pervaded the Aris-

totelian model must be excised from the picture.

Although

anthropocentrism cannot be entirely shed from consciousness,
a

model is available for an ethic which does not feature

human-centeredness

.
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The ecocentric relational self
At this point,
is clear.

the problem of environmental
ethics

The di srelational self constitutes
a homocentric

society which not only lacks but is
logically unable to
develop an ecological morality. On the
fringes of the
social spectrum there are some people who
practice

munal morality which takes animals into
account.

a

com-

Such

people will go to great lengths to save animals,
often at
great cost to themselves.

Yet, according to our western

intellectual tradition we should all be homocentrists

Relational morality does not fit with our time.

Homocen-

trists are busy extinguishing large numbers of species.

Ecocentrists are busy saving as many individuals of various
species as they can.

indefinitely.

But this contradiction cannot continue

What is at stake here is not only the lives

of animals, but also the nature of human life.

If the

homocentrist prevails, then all moral consciousness will
be erased and people will seek the means of survival with-

out thought of the "quality" of what they seek to secure.

Although relational moral action had

a

basis in

ancient theory, its dependence in theory on the closed social
systems of early civilizations sealed its fate.

In the

centuries of abundance, there was little thought about

eradication of nature because it seemed quite impossible.
In the new condition of scarcity,

the nature of human

.
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destructiveness has struck

a

chord in the sensibilities

of a minority in many different
countries.

It now

appears that relational thinking has
sprung up once again,
in a new form, promising a new
kind of praxis or moral
action
In the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer
there is a central

concern with the Greek concept of phronisis,
"intellectual
virtue," the basis for "ethical know-how. "^^
Gadamer
insists that even in the midst of the most corrupt
society
there can be phronisis

,

as we see in the examples of

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (among others one supposes).
Yet there is a certain conceptual distortion here,
because
the word "corrupt" does not capture any essential nature
of a society, not even one "gone bad."
a

Corruption suggests

good society with bad elements in it, and by "good soci-

ety" can be meant a social foundation for that very

phronisis

.

The problem of homocentric society is radically

different

Homocentrism cannot be characterized in the valueladen terms of anthropos

.

Its description concerns the

total absence of moral thinking

moral ideas.

— the

neutralization of

(This phenomenon does not conflict with any

self -description within that society as "religious" or

"moral," but, paradoxically, the two phenomena go hand in
hand.)

The appearance of relational thought and action
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in the midst of homocentrism
is directly related
to the

greatest single catastrophe of
our age:
the destruction
of wild nature.
With this description of self
and world
interconnected, the argument and
interrogation continues,
forcing to the surface the little
discussed aspect of
rational thought in its moral bearing,
that the nature of
the self is the nature of its
world.

Hence, the self can-

not overlay on its social relations
an ethic fundamentally
in conflict with its own social
being.

Summary
This chapter examined the ill-founded logic
of

species preservation, the logic of animal rights,
reflecting
its homocentric foundations.
a

In contrast,

social basis for ecocentrism was begun.

the concept of

This task con-

tinues in chapter three.
The way is now clear for a further explanation of
the problem of an ecocentric consciousness.

stated simply.

It can be

Aldo Leopold's fame as an environmental

philosopher stems from his work on the concept of
ethic.

a

land

In one of the most quoted passages from his work,

he spells out the sense of such a standpoint.

The formu-

lation is that
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.
It is wrong when it tends otherwi se -^2
.

,

The problem is that a
homocentric consciousness
would not see this ethic to be
a rational approach to
its own welfare, and would not,
therefore, perceive the
"inner truth" of this view. The
view itself is not a
simple, rational formulation of a
position that any

neutral investigator would come to
see as

a

sound and

well-founded idea of the best arrangement
for any social
version of reality. At the same time, it
is not a simpl

normative viewpoint.

Instead, the formulation reflects

an ecocentric vision which in turn is an
adherence to

principles that themselves shape consciousness. If
these
principles of ecological thinking are at all "normative,
they are so only in the sense that the self incorporates
these principles as its standpoint.
The concept of an ethic in terms of the triad,

principle of selfhood as
lematic.

a

a

moral ideal, is clearly prob-

The difficulties are examined in chapter three

The argument and interrogation proceed dialecti cal
ly

developing further the concept of
for a sustainable society.

a

land ethic, a basis

CHAPTER

III

UNIFYING THE BIFURCATION

Does Humanity Need Wild Nature?

When Durkheim proposed

society and nature,

conceptual split between

the bifurcation was already a
well

established psychological fact.
totally alien.

a

Wild nature had become

This phenomenon in which society tried

to escape its origins in nature by
making it wholly other
is

the central phenomenon of this study.

Wild nature has

been understood here to refer to the macroworld
of the

larger animals and plants; homocentrism was shown to
be
a

modern society-centered consciousness cut off from
other

aspects of the living world, producing

a

bifurcation which

leaves society unable to depict the exact sense of nature
to which animals belong.

"^'^

The moral significance of the bifurcation was

focal point in chapter one.
in a more detailed form.

a

Here that inquiry continues

Following the practice of the

previous chapter, the development of

a

land ethic in

modern society is used here to contrast with the bifurcated consciousness.

Accordingly, it will be fruitful

to make use of a passage in John Stuart Mill
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that is

uncharacteristic of Mill's thought.

Nonetheless, its

bearing on the moral significance of
the bifurcation
startling.
Mill is reflecting in this passage
on an
imagined world in which
nothing

"...

spontaneous activity of nature

"...

of a world in which

into cultivation

.

.

for human beings

.

.

.

[is]

.

.

."^^

IS

left to the

Mill despaired

every rood of land [is] brought

which is capable of growing food
in which one finds

.every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed
up, all quadrapeds or birds which are not
domesticated
for man's use exterminated as his rivals for food,
every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and
scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower
could grow without being eradicated as a weed in
the name of improved agriculture.
.

.

.

Such a world

...

"...

without natural beauty and grandeur

IS not good for man." 3 7

"...

is

.

the cradle

of

Mill adds that wild nature

thoughts and aspirations which

are not only good for the individual, but which society
oo

could ill do without."
Is Mill right?

Is

this sort of world, or one even

further removed from Mill's vision,
good for man"?
in such a world,

a

world that is "not

For if it is good, if humans can survive
then there is no strong case to be made

against homocentri sm

.

The claims of some who find our

transformation of wild places and the destruction of nonhuman items morally abhorrent would come to little or
nothing.

Is Mill's description of nature as

"a cradle
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of thoughts and aspirations" a
persuasive picture concerning how a humane life is possible?
The humane life is

surely Mill's meaning.

is most important

that Mill's nightmare suggests

a

to note

course of events in

which the imagery of the bifurcated
consciousness becomes
a permanent reality.
We can picture this course of events.

First,

strip away the forests, plow the resulting
meadows, and

plant crops.

The next step is to build towns.

ress prevents a static condition.

But prog-

Towns spread and farm-

land is then threatened with extinction.

Such

a

course

of events is a manifestation of the bifurcated conscious-

ness.

The mind of homocentrism is inclined to mold its

world forever to the image of the molder.
point is to realize the molded

and

The ultimate

the molder as one.

that is, a progressively more built environment is the

only course of action; every rood of land is ultimately

replaced by another fabricated item in an unceasing process
Wild nature, in Mill's description of it, disappears.

Preservationists may continue to resist the unceasing
process, but just as old architecture

is

constantly being

replaced by newer creations, so also the transfiguration
by homocentrism begins to look like Mill's picture in which

even small "nature" preserves seem destined for change
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Homocentrists reply that society can
incorporate
nature, can build parks for the
respite of

those who weary

of concrete, and can set aside
some flowery wastes so that

nature is not forgotton.

There is

a

limit, they would say,

beyond which wild nature gets in the
way of the great enterprise.
The path back to nature is sentimental,
the claim
goes.
Those who manifest a wish to return to
more natural
surroundings exhibit a pastoral impulse. A
"pastoral
impulse," Leo Marx explains, is an "urge, in
the face of

society's increasing power and complexity, to
retreat in
the direction of nature. "^°
to a landscape that

intervention." 41

It

is an

impulse to retreat

"bears fewer of the marks of human

Looked upon as an escape from the delib-

erately planned, the impulse would seem to give rise to

a

"nature" at once fertile, unpredictable, vital and mysterious, as many writers have suggested.
be approached with caution.

Such writing should

The dichotomizing of "human"

and "nature" subtly leads one to believe that there is
but one way to interact with wild nature,

an idea as

preposterous as homocentric thought itself.

Environmental-

ists who accept

(or subscribe to) mutterings about "nature,"

fully contribute to

a

rationality that tries (with great

effectiveness) to stiffle the idea that thought and action
are implicated in wild nature's being.
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What homocentrists have
gained is

society accepts plastic trees,

a

world in which

because rationality has

been transformed to make
indiscernible any fundamental
difference between the "natural"
and the artificial,
especially if they have the "same"
utility value. Mill
seems to have had in mind a less
drastic revision of
nature than what we already have.
Our improvements include
"improved" agriculture, but even our
improved agriculture
gives way to malls and hamburger strips.
Mill stated that the absence of wild
nature is not

good for any human.

Presumably, what Mill meant by "not

good" was that some image of what it is to be
human would
be lost if all wild nature disappeared.

By "not good for

man" he implied that all men and women are alike in
sharing
one humanity.

could come

a

If Mill was wrong on this point,

there

time when the total absence of wild nature is

perfectly good for people.

Using this passage from Mill

helps to bring out the thesis that, for

a

certain type of

humanity, the absence of wild nature is perfectly good.
Mill's implicit assumption that all humanity is
alike flatly contradicts the bifurcation thesis.

contradicts it in

a

fruitful way.

tive vision of human life

— the

But he

For example, his norma-

cradle of thoughts and
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aspirations-is in direct violation
of tenets dearly
held by .any pos t-.oderns

.

Note that "direct violation"

is not the same as "direct
conflict"; Mill is not in con-

flict with instrumental views
of nature.

He is making a

statement about the nature of
"man," not one about the
uses of nature; although one
can imply the other, Mill
can be read (here) to mean that
a ruthless attitude
toward
wild nature is inconsistent with
his view of humanity.

The

idea of humanity as nurtured by
contact with

wild nature involves some subtleties.
interaction,

a

The suggestion of

mixing of spirit and substance, of
sense

and essence, is profoundly lost on many
moderns who see

nature in terms that are shockingly simplistic.

For

example, William Baxter says

reject the proposition that we ought to respect
'balance of nature' or to preserve the environment' unless the reason for doing so, express
or implied, is the benefit of man. ^5
I

the

'

The assumptions about man and nature are so un-

conscious that

a

notion such as respect for ecological

balance is believed to take place in an intellectual vacuum
apart from lived experience.

But if it is a lived ex-

perience that leads to respect for ecological balance,
then how would this respect not be beneficial to the one
who is respectful?

As for the "benefit of man," one

must wonder what benefits are being valued.
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These conceptual confusions

are

bred by valuations

that the valuer would rather not
make clear.

fusions have by turns led to

a

These con-

complete loss of public

understanding about the meaning of
environmental i sm
Some
further conf us ions— enbedded in
homocentric rationalityshould be explored to help further the
line of development
toward a concept of ecocentric, relational
thought.
.

Human chauvinism
Human chauvinism is taken to be analogous to forms
of social discrimination, albeit here it is
descrimination

between humans and nonhumans
a

.

Richard and Val Routley in

critique of human chauvinism^^ believe human chauvinism

to be the problem resonsible for the situation in which

animals are excluded from value and morality.
life has

"...

Nonhuman

value or [creates] constraints on human

action only insofar as these items serve human interests
or purposes."

46

This is the definition of human chauvinism

in its strong sense.

It

tells us that virtually all humans

have a strong preference for their own interests where such

interests may conflict

v^zith

the interests of animals.

A

similar view is taken by Richard Ryder^'^ and Peter Singer.

Ryder coined the term "speciesism" to document what he
takes to be

"

.

.

.

the belief that we are entitled to

treat members of other species in

a

way in which it would
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be wrong to treat mernbers
of our own species.

Like

human chauvinism, speciesisrn
purportedly explains why
in many contexts, from
trapping fur bearing animals
to
laboratory experimentation to
the poisoning of predators
we discriminate against
animals.
Singer uses
the

lerm

because he has in mind an "animal
liberation," which is
an unabashedly social analogy.
We have,

if we join these philosophers,

moved

imperceptibly from Mill's version of why
humans need nature
to a position in which other
species are
spoken about as

if they shared the social world
with humans but are merely

discriminated against.

Singer, defending the analogy

between racism and speciesism, helps to
radically shift the
meaning of the debate.
The non-racist would do well to bear the
analogy in
mind when he is inclined to defend human behavior
toward nonhumans
'Shouldn't we worry about improving
the lot of our own species before we concern
ourselves
with other species?' he may ask.
If we substitute
race' for 'species' we shall see that the question
is better not asked. ^0
.

The temptation to accept social analogies is easy to under-

stand and superficially compelling.

Yet,

the problem with

both speciesism and human chauvinsim as labels is that we
are hard put to name their opposites.
of a human chauvinist?

What is the opposite

Somehow the Routleys and Singer

have managed to puzzle us by implying that human chauvinism
and speciesism are escapable in

a

philosophically cogent

s
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way.

Stated as

discursive argument, the best
outcome
such philosophers can hope for
is to persuade others
to
their view.
This approach see.s to
profoundly undermine
the true nature of the
environmental problem.
Far more explanatory of our
actual situation is to
a

say that we are cut off from
a certain consciousness of
wild nature, rather than to employ
the rhetoric of egalitarianism.
What, after all, is the moral stance
to be

taken once the case against human
chauvinism is made?
The term "chauvinsim

,

"

like "speciesi sm

,

"

while

intelligible as social analogy, does not in
fact guide
us to an ethic that is ecologically sound,
nor do these

terms suggest a systematic approach for changing
behavior.
The real complaint, of course, is against

a

purely discursive

ethic, some "environmental ethic" based on ideas deriving

from homocentric consciousness.

Arguments for preserva-

tion or "humaneness" grounded in the homocentrist

'

rationality lead to just the unwanted result.
The preservationist who seeks to save various

species by using instrumental language, the very language

which obscures the self's relation to the land and hence
to wild habitat, disassociates wildlife from humanity.

In doing so,

such preservationists destroy the whole point

of preservation while also ensuring that huge quantities
of life will die.

This point can be illustrated by

a

.

brief look at Paul and
Anne Ehrllch's book
Extinct:ion
Their argument looks like
this.
Stripping away nature
may not be good for hu.ans
because of what the Ehrlichs
describe as "rivet popping. "51
^^^^.^^^
popping rivets is the destruction
of species.
The sense
of the metaphor is that
spaceship earth cannot fly safely
If we "pop," i.e., destroy,
those elements which hold the
craft together.
We never know when we will
kill off one
crucial species, the absence of
which will destroy the
spaceship
The rivet-popping argument is not
persuasive.
The homocentric human is already
engaged in numerous harmful practices such as the dumping of
radioactive wastes

into the oceans; the thought that it is
possibly dangerous
to kill off species fails to impress
the decision-makers.

In any case,

the rivet-popping analogy hardly functions

as it was intended, namely to save wildlife
from extinction

This could only be done by finding

a

powerful argument that

would go some way to prevent the killing of individuals of
a

species.

The rivet-popping argument only tells us that

we may be in for trouble if we continue to pop rivets.

It

does not tell us that it is not in our interests to kill

individual nonhumans

.

It fact,

many benefits accrue from

the kill ing of individual animals of numerous species,

but the dividing line between individuals and the whole

.

of the species is only
found when the species
become

"endangered"; then each individual
begins to count.
Homocentrists will never notice that
more and more rivets are
missing.
Nothing short of an unmitigated
disaster could
convince them that all along
something was going wrong.
Reading the Ehrlichs' book, one
has the feeling
that they want to say something
less egocentric than they
actually do say.^^ ^^^^
^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^ precautions
to prevent the popping of crucial
rivets.
They seem
to

want to say that we moderns should stop
the carnage now.
But they fear a reply that the short
term benefits outweigh
the long term possibility of ecological
damage.
Therefore
they try to appeal to the egoist's self-interest,
but ac-

tually they undo their own position.

The homocentrist can

say that although it is probable that some untoward
events

will be the result of a catastrophe visited upon diverse

species, it is hard to foretell exactly what these will
be.

The Ehrlichs are careful not to be too specific about

the exact consequences for us of mass extinction, yet they

strongly imply the threat to human viability.

The argument,

placed on such empirical conditions, only makes it more
likely that one species after another will disappear.

Instrumental reasons for saving species are futile.

Anything short of the destruction of the "spacecraft"
would leave instrumental reason intact.

In fact,

instru-

s
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mental reason has a tendency to
show the benefits of
extirpating wild nature, e.g., the
destruction of habitat
to make way for crops or
development.
Certainly poachers
of wild nature, e.g., ivory
hunters, will not be convinced
by instrumental reasons.

On the institutional level, instrumental
reason,
such as cost-benefit analysis, is
required because public
policy is based on the concept of rationality—
society
'

current notion of reason.

Due to such analyses, benefits

tend to be analyzed on the same level of
immediacy as the

calculations of poachers.

Even in the "enlightened"

countries, environmental considerations are the result
of

compromise between short term gains and calculations about
the long term environmental effect.

All who subscribe to

the rationality that regulates the flow of commodities

unwittingly subscribe to the extinction of species, and
certainly to inhumane slaughter.
The point has now been illustrated that homocentric

consciousness, in all of its modes of reasoning, e.g.,

human chauvinism or instrumentalism
of species.

,

leads to the extinction

It was argued that no purely discursive

reasoning will work to save wild nature.
One further analysis (or interrogation) of the

homocentric predicament remains to be made.
here is

a

The theme

curious parallel to the extinction problem;
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it is the question of
hu.an survival.

Since it has beco.e

commonplace to observe that
humanity may not prevail, ^3
many writers deal with the
issue as if it were an
either/or
issue.
Either we change or we will
not survive.
This

view has been met by the counter
argument that (for various
reasons) humanity may very well
survive,
and that fears

of our imminent demise have
been exaggerated.

guise, the whole debate has grown
stale.

In this

More important,

the issues are treated in terms
of homocentric rationality.
The questioning can begin here.

Future generations
In his paper "Do We Owe the Future Anything?"

Richard

T.

DeGeorge exhibits

a

paradigmatic example of

the homocentric view of future generation.

What is

especially clear is that DeGeorge cannot be called
chauvinist.

a

human

His argument is this.

Only existing entities have rights.
Nonexistent entities by defintion do not exist.
What does not exist cannot be the subiect or bearer
of rights. 5^

DeGeorge is especially concerned to argue that it

is

to

distant future generations that we owe no duties since
these nonexistents have no claim.

He is not conerned to

argue that parents have no obligations to their yet unborn
children.

What is wrong with this position?
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First let us ask if "rights"
iigncs at-p
are the proper subject
of his inquiry.
The argument is:

Consider the general attitude
towards the ancient
^^^y
anything' Sid
therh/"""
obligations to us? ^It is
clelr tut.T^
clear
that there are no sanctions
we can imnose on
them and no way we can enforce
any
obuL^Tons wp
may claim they had toward us.
But surelv evpn
ra.se the question of their
obligationl^

ur?s'odd.55

What is odd is the "us."

Did the Greeks, any ancient

Greeks, have us in mind?

While they could not picture

even modern Greek peoples, they could
and did have control
over the destiny of the land.
The question is not about
future peoples, but rather about the world
future peoples
will inherit.
DeGeorge makes the question sound
odd.

But surely it is wrong to claim that the
environment belongs

only to the living, that future generations will
be out of
luck.

It is perfectly possible to blame earlier
genera-

tions for leaving a barren wasteland of desert conditions.

Future generations are not so much unborn as they are part
of a future that has not yet come to pass.

We present

generations are responsible to the future, that is, we
ought not prevent it from coming to pass.

Although we cannot conceive of the distant future,
our thoughts are to the next generation and theirs to the

next after them.

It

is

fallacious to argue that we have

no obligations to distant future peoples since we have
a

clear prima facie obligation to the next generation,

.

and so on.

The question, then, never
concerned rights and
duties but has always concerned
interests.
Future generations have, by definition, a
future interest in co.ing to
be.
They have as well future
interests that they will
inherit an unspoiled world.
If future interests are
a

consideration, we owe the future
everything possibL.e
Homocentrists, however, have no ties
to the future,

DeGeorge illustrates.

as

Only the mutual obligations of
the

living remain, since not meeting an
obligation to
person could have unpleasant consequences,

living

a

but not meeting

an obligation to "the future" does not
incur any unpleasant

consequences.

DeGeorge establishes that to owe someone something
means that someone else has
it.

a

consequent right to receive

This sort of obligation is contractual; it is

legalistic morality.

a

Obligations to one's own children

can be of this sort, although the legalistic character of

obligations to grandchildren becomes somewhat tenuous.
Such obligation dissipates over time; one's own great-

grandchildren are no longer the recipients of an obligation.
In this sense DeGeorge is right; we owe nothing to the

future.

This, however, raises a pressing question.

If

there is no contractual obligation to the distant future,
is

there no moral obligation of any kind from one generation

to the next?

.

Yet, if there is only
legalistic morality, it Is
hard to see how a moral
continuity can come about'
DeGeorg
says that we do have
obligations to our own children,
but
not to the indefinite future.
His confusion stems from
a mistake about the
meaning of an obligation in
an "environ

mental" context.

Obligation does not mean that by
doing X
a person A fulfills his/her
obligation.
Its moral meaning
is discovered rather in a
relational mode of apprehending.
The question, then, is about our
relation
to the future.

Legally we have no relation to the
future.

Therefore moral

continuity does not depend on what we are
obligated to do,
but on what we want to do as a matter
of self-definition.

The transfer of this definition is bound
up with moral continuity.
An environmental ethic is incoherent if
each gen-

eration has to begin anew.

The protection of wild nature

depends on moral continuity if our self-definition
bound up with that nature.
lies with

a

strong defense of

is

The case against homocentrism
a

land ethic which requires

just this moral continuity.
In the next section the argument will proceed by

critique, at the end of which it will be possible to

defend the thesis concerning moral continuity.

For now,

the task is to lay bare the mind that makes plausible the

neutralization of consciousness discussed in the first
chapter

—

.

.
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Moral Continuifvr
^^h^^c^ f
Environmental (^^nnt^vf

.^^

The argument, which has
taken several forms-obs ervation, analysis, and contrast-has
been directed against
the discursive reasoning of
certain "environmentalists"

who exhibit the consciousness
of homocentrism as much as
others who share thac human feature.
The immediate task

ahead is to take the argument further,
to inquire in more
depth about homocentric thought.
One aspect of homocentric thought too
interesting
to pass over is its very own critique
of environmentalism

In the advanced societies,

the mention of the word

"environmentalist" conjures up thoughts of people who
reject all the hard work of generations to deliver
to
the ordinary person the goods and benefits once
enjoyed

only by the rich.

Environmentalism is associated with

privilege and also selfishness.

Mark Sagoff makes this

point
If we took Locke to Ocean City, moreover, what would
he see?
Would he see a lot of people starving while
a privileged few eat salmon and drink Chateau Margaux?
No.
Locke would see just about everyone lined up
for steamed crabs, ice cream, and beer.
Not bad
for $3.95.
To show Locke Ocean City is not to
present to him the horrors of social inequality.
It is to show him the horrors of social equality.
Schlock on every block. K-Mart lowers the price.
Who can complain when $250 on the used car market
buys an eight-cylinder four-on-the floor '73 Impala
with mags and stripes? It goes from 0 to 80 in ten
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iTuToMir-

"-^^^ ^vccs
so°wh:r?f''? ^^^^^
muffler?
"^<^^=.^
Locke
might point out thafi' i,
baftloL of beau y'on he East^Jnlhn^.''^'
^hore are It"
the estates
of the rich.
There are a 1o?
to redistribute

wealt"ln%hfunUen:i

Pun?i rj^^^i-th-

-^e-f-h^

o

r

es'

hfr°"^

?S

caT^he^h:[[t"h^?.-^:ho^-r.r:i?-^^^
The derision expressed here
toward "environmental
quality" sharply puts in focus the
absurd idea floating
around in homocentric society that
the environmental

question can be expressed in the rhetoric
of democratic

equality-that, since the notion

is a matter of opinion,

it can be subject to the wants and
desires of all.

of course,

the notion is a farcical one

beautification— a product of

a

— something

But,

like

peculiar rationality.

In

spite of this "straw man" issue, environmentalists
are

subject to ridicule for wanting

a

beautiful, healthful

environment at almost everyone else's expense.
The unself-conscious confusion is nearly total.

Indeed, many environmentalists accept the version of

their project attributed to them by the larger society.
The homocentric version of environmentalism comes to

little more than

a

choice of social goods for consumers.

The ideology of choice serves homocentric consciousness

well, especially because its one-dimensional understanding

portrays

a

problem that is easy to grasp.

,
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from

Homocentrism also gets philosophical
service
its intellectual workers.
They can

help to legiti-

naate

a

society cut off from nature.

They might point out

that human chauvinism is not
entirely escapable and they
will take this to mean that we
can only make social contracts and not contracts with nature.
They will argue
that environmentalists confuse
sentiment with morality
when wild nature is the object in
question.
Let us see

if they are right about the view
that we have certain

limited obligations to society and nothing
more.

would say

,

They

after all

Morality is fundamentally a matter of self
interest
modified only by such agreements constraining shortterm self interested activity as may be in the
interests of agents to make.'^^
The idea of moral continuity makes no sense under
this

definition of morality; since there could be no point to
moral continuity in an atomistic world, its logic does
not fit with the logic of the bifurcation.

Thus the words

"morality" and "sentiment" have different meanings for

homocentrists than for others who are not caught up in
this perception of the world.

It was cautioned in

chapter one that one ought not to refer to "environmentalists" since some make assumptions fully consistent with

homocentrism

.

So the statement about the limits of a

contract is tautological with respect to homocentrism
and absurd with respect to ecocentrism.
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There are countless examples
of rational-discursive
argument concerning nature,
environment, and human society
that lead to just this kind
of absurd conclusion and
puzzlement.
By now the reason should
be apparent.
The forms of
rationality suitable for a commodity
orientation, including,
on the one hand, the objectivism
called for by the guardians
of official knowledge, and, on
the other, the tyranny of
value-relativism, are absurd for ecological
thinking.

When some philosophers discuss the
problems of
extinction or of cruelty to animals in the
discourse of
homocentrism, one gets an uneasy feeling that
something
fundamental has gone wrong.

For although the discussion

seems logical, the character of the discourse
seems somehow

bizarre.

In light of the relational idea of morality and

its connection with the nature of selfhood— the whole
point

of a preservationist approach to exi stence— the following

fragment seems as pointless as it seems ludicrous.
While there may be a loose sense of the term in which
we can say that it is in the interests of a tree to
be watered, this attenuated sense of the term is not
the sense covered by the principle of equal consideration of interests.
All we mean when we say that it is
in the interests of a tree to be watered is that the
tree needs water if it is to continue to live and grow
normally; if we regard this as evidence that the tree
has interests, we might almost as well say that it is
in the interests of a car to be lubricated regularly
because the car needs lubrication if it is to run
properly.
In neither case can we really mean (unless
we impute consciousness to trees or cars) that
the
tree or car has any preference about the matter.
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When Mill said that the disappearance
of wild nature
is not good for humans, he
meant something more than his
own utilitarianism would hint
at.
Although living forms,
and even nonliving ones, are
integral parts of a living
system which includes humans. Mill
does not mean that human
survival depends on keeping these forms
intact.
He seems

to mean that we can radically
transform nature and still

survive, but that we could not retain
quite the same nature.
Yet Mill's reflection is but an unargued
claim about the
sense of human being.

For our contemporaries, however,

this claim seems much less arguable that it
would have been

for Mill; otherwise it seems strange that there
should be

environmentalists at all.
a

The only conclusion is that for

certain human society the well-being of wild nature is

alien to its sel f -understanding
Mill's version of humanity.

,

and hence antithetical to

By this route,

the thesis has

been demonstrated that moral continuity depends on

a

capac-

ity to participate (in the Platonic sense) in the nonhuman

world, gaining thereby a form of knowledge that is indis-

tinguishable from moral understanding.
Moral continuity, as we can now see, depends on
a

continuity in consciousness from one human to the next

and from one generation to the next.

comes through participation.
fully.

That continuity

This should be noted care-

Participation, if looked at through strictly social
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eyes, would be sheer mystery.

It involves a knowledge

of one's own transitory nature
in relation to a wider

consciousness.
Many thinkers have thought that
advanced industrial
society necessarily precludes this
form of consciousness,
and that the self -understanding
here called "homocentrism"
is an unavoidable outcome of history
and culture.
If it
were, there would be no possibility of

a

widespread ecocen-

trism because it would be illogical and
almost inconceivable.
However, it is homocentrism that is illogical,
and
some think that its future is nearly inconceivable.

On the

grounds that ecocentric relational being is both
logical
and desirable because it has the capacity to sustain
life

indefinitely the argument continues.

A land ethic

Ecocentrism means to heal the homocentric bifurcation.

The moral implications of this unifying effort have

been drawn out.

Land is the central notion in the relation

between ecocentrists and wild nature.

For them, land has

the meaning of a relational quality which cannot be found
in typical human relations of moral obligation.

distinct type of relation.
like this.

It

is a

The explanation for it goes

.
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Like Aide Leopold's land
ethic, the present version
takes land to ''enlarge the
boundaries of the co..unity
to

include soils, waters, plants,
and ani.als, or collectively:
the land.
This enlargement of the
community
idea is

the basis for moral continuity
between generations.

A land

ethic is best understood in
terms of this enlargement of
boundaries.
In a word, the land ethic
is an ecological
ethic.
The kind of human benefit to
be derived from it is
so intertwined with a form of
life that one is hard put to
speak of particular benefits.
It is, however, just this
form of human good which is intertwined
with the good of
other species.
By speaking as though the self
was the

object of the environmental quest, by
developing

a

language

for the relational self, other species
benefit in the long
run

Ecocentric philosophy is

a

ends, not merely of social means.

philosophy of ecological
When the idea of species

preservation is legislated in homocentric society, the
result is likely to look like this.

John Rodman tell us

that
it becomes evident that the preoccupation with
saving species from extinction can become an absolute
abstracted from the larger and more complex issue of
defending a habitat that is shared by humans and nonhumans alike.
To assume automatically that either
snail darters or human beings can be artificially
transplanted from one locale to another without
being significantly changed presupposes a remarkably
atomistic view of the world. Where this leads is
.

.

.
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shown by the proposal to
'save' the r=.nf„
condor by breeding
In captlvltytsS^

•

U

The atomistic Ideal Is clearly
Integral to homocentric thought. Clearly ecocentrlc
thought Is based on
ecological ideas in both the moral
and rational sense
Chat sustains an economy of nature
and a social economy
of conservation.
Its metaphor is the ecological
system

which

.performs a function which contributes to
the
overall flow of materials, services, and
energy
withm the system. Plants, while nourishing
themselves on air, water, and minerals fix
solar energy
on a form utilizable by some animals.
They also
produce free oxygen as a by-product
Grazing animals,
as they feed directly on plants, begin
the
recycling plant nutrients, restoring carbon process of
dioxide
to the air, and minerals to the soil,
a process
completed by worms and bacteria.
In general, each
thing has a certain role or function in the
natural
economy to which it becomes adapted; and ecologists
speak of producers consumers, decomposers and fit
each to its 'niche' in the ecosystem.
•

•

.

,

,

To speak of these components of an ecosystem as

having moral standing is, paradoxically, to reflect the

rationality productive of moral neutralization.
rationality being developed here is
politics.

a

The

new basis for moral

Aristotle's theory demonstrates

a

version of

morally integrated thought and action; but it could not
serve as a model. Undoing homocentric reason brings one
to realize that self and reason are bound up with the

timeless mute world.
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Summary
Clearly moral-rational thought,
as it emerges in
ecocentrism, is a far more encompassing
characteristic than
traditional notions of an ethic.
Numerous writers have
mentioned the idea of an integrated
social consciousness
involving interconnections between ecology,
economy, (soft)
technology, and an appropriate socio-polity
Its contrast
with the minimal political participation
in America is
obvious.
Yet nothing less than a restructuring
.

of con-

sciousness would produce people and institutions
that
worked in harmony, cooperation, and trust.

The steps taken

here to understand ecocentric selfhood represent

with conventional thinking.

a

break

The contribution in these

pages has to go beyond prescription to

a

theory of ration-

ality, an integration of mind and environment.
The present work avoids prescriptive social theory;
it does not suggest an ideal toward which industrial so-

ciety ought to aim.

Instead it is

a

working out of

a

theory necessary to define what millions of people globally
have sought to express, especially in their actions.
son,

Rea-

self, and moral meaning have been understood to be

integrated in

a

of wild nature.

conception of being that entails the world
Because these three components are taken

to be separate and distinct in homocentric society,

produce epistemic, moral, and social problems.

they

CHAPTER

IV

DECONSTRUCTING HOMOCENTRIC POLITICS

Politics, Persons, and Worlds

Facing the realities of

a

growing world population,

many writers have raised the issue of
food and land use.
Feeding the human world increasingly comes
at the expense
of wildlife habitat.

It is now possible to foresee a

crowded world where every acre of land will be
used for
improved agriculture, for human dwellings, or for
commerce.
We can see a world in which human survival will
be the

only consideration.

Homocentric environmental issues mean

food, energy, and resources for a weary world.

The idea

of land left relatively untouched will seem absurd.

Re-

source conscious writers would think Mill's fears quaint
in the light of the new realities.

They speak of space-

ship earth as having first and fourth class accomodations,

with the third world countries riding in fourth class
while countries like the United States have first class
seats.

Given the realities of starvation and overpopula-

tion, and given the specter of world disorder and the
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possibility of nuclear holocaust,
can we really take seriously the environmentalists
who continue to sound
Mill's
fears? We answer yes, since
these very problems are the
outcome of a homocentric way of
life.

Ecocentric politics focuses primarily
on society
as a community of man and
nature; it sees in community the
principles of a sustainable society.
So foreign are ecocentric ideals to the dominant bifurcated
version of society
that ecocentrism appears to be almost
unintelligible.
Its

purpose of transforming society to

ecocentrism

a

a

sustainable type makes

moral politics, but one not much in keeping

with the business of cost-benefit analysis.

Communities

in conjunction with wild species are what
need to be sus-

tained, according to ecocentrism.
The dominant consciousness maintains a politics

which displaces ecocentric content about wild nature with
concerns that are wholly external to the self.

Hence we

find an emphasis on health rather than, say, well-being,
or an emphasis on amenities rather than the presevation
of wild places.

Homocentric environmentalism is not mys-

terious; it is about external things.

external thing, for example,

a

An amenity is an

recreational facility, or

perhaps an overcrowded park like Yellowstone.

Homocentric

environmental politics also concerns piecemeal planning,
for it has no vision.
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Ecocentrists declare that their
way of life is
based on environmental viability.
Espousing the view that
a society should be based
on ecologically sound
principles
of homeostasis, the ecocentrist
is not concerned simply
with some segment of experience
known as an environmental
concern; all of ecocentric experience
is environmental.
It is therefore difficult to
express ecocentric
ideals in

the homocentric language of externality.
It is not hard to express steady
state principles

as such.

Political ecologists who will be prominent
in

this chapter have already stated these
principles.

More

elusive is the moral-political principle which
could bring
about

a

steady state sustainable society.

Politics in the

tradition of Hobbes and Adam Smith has focused on the content of a contractual social scheme.
It will be argued here that since the narrowed

consciousness of people who have come to understand social
reality to be the arrangements necessary to procure their
needs and wants cannot conceive of another kind of politics,
and since the dominant reality is the reality that centers
on these various wants and needs, the idea of political

reality has degenerated into modes of power in pursuit of
wants.

No wonder,

then,

that corporate power has molded

the wants and desires of the masses to suit its own desires,

since this practice conforms to the spirit and letter of
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politics in the advanced countries.

There can be no doubt

that an underlying purpose in
the commodity society is
the
production of commodity-oriented
participants.
Such a

purpose is consistent with the
great traditions of politics
in the West.
Specifically, politics has been at once
a

pursuit of ends and the shaper of
the political mind, the
one in pursuit of ends.
It is a closed loop.
The difference with ecocentric politics is a
difference in the vision
of the self (the pursuer) and of the
ends to
be pursued.

That most normative term, the "person," is
cal term.

In the tradition of the social contract,

ideal has been the creation of

"person" in

a

a

politithe

"citizen" rather than a

form consistent with, say, philosophical

"Subjectivism," in which the person is
and meaning (and perhaps truth).

Christian Bay,

a

a

a

locus of value

Consider

a

statement by

contemporary political theorist.

The particular harm that a century of liberalism
has accomplished to be sure along with some progressive
achievements has been to trap much of the human spirit
of emancipation within the false imagery of individualistic pursuit of happiness and civil liberties.
Liberals have persistently tended to cut the citizen off
from the person; and they have placed on their humanistic pedestal a cripple of a man, a man without a
moral or political nature; a man with plenty of contractual rights and obligations, perhaps, but a man
without moorings in any real community; a drifter
rather than a being with roots in species solidarity.
Liberalism, in short, for all the comparative advantages
for the better-off in liberal societies (in contrast
to feudal, fascist, or military-ruled or even allegedly
socialist societies), has drastically impoverished our
appreciation of man's nature and potentialities.""^

—

—

The remarkable simiLarity between
Mill's reflection
and this one resides in their implicit
normative politics.
They both assume, without argument,
a vision of human nature.
Liberal politics in the contract tradition
has

claimed to produce

a

public citizen and

a

private person.

Bay's complaint is really about reduction
of the private

person to the most trivial sort or subjectivism.

Other

theorists have complained that the citizen too
has been

reduced to the trivia of the political and economic
market
place

.

It was argued that the bifurcation has created the

decline of the human subject to the human object.

The

quest for the "person" or the moral nature of human selfhood reflects this condition of ob jectif ication

.

But poli-

tics is complicated, and so the quest is confused with other

issues and problems of human needs.
The connection between self and world, and hence

between moral ideals and politics, has been drawn out in

contrast to homocentric rationality.

Problems of natural

resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and the con-

tinuing destruction of wild nature all precipitated

literature of

a

a

political ecology in which the political

dispute takes curious turns, many of which implicate the
clash between ecocentrism and homocentri sm

.

These twists

and turns will be traced in order to understand the diffi-

Ill

cuUles presented

to ecocentrlsm by the
confusions of homo-

centrism.

The political ecology debate

Political ecology can be understood
to be grounded
in ecocentric thought.
If there is to
be a sustainabl,.e

world, society and nature must be
viewed holistically
Political ecologists are not, however,
agreed on the aim
of politics under this name, and so
the label has been

attached to several very different kinds
of politics.
problem is both conceptual and methodological.

The

Some inter-

pretations of political ecology insistently turn
ecology
back into economy.

Insisting that economy and ecology are the same
in subject matter and in their ramifications,
Alexander

Cockburn and James Ridgeway write in

a

volume entitled

Political Ecology that:
A political ecology that does not regard as
central the fact of structural unemployment must be
rightly perceived as marginal or frivolous: a political ecology that does not integrate such central
economic issues into its analysis and programs has
failed before it begins a victim of the same tunnel
vision that has been the crippling limitation of
middle, class reform movements for the last few decades

—

.

We can forgive the difficulty many writers find in under-

standing the operation of the word "political" on the

H2
word "ecology...

YeC It is hard to forgive
the deliberate

misuse of this pairing to explain
away ecology as political
economy so that there Is virtually
nothing left of nature.
Awareness Is constantly brought
to focus on social welfare
issues at the expense of the
deeper Issue.
We are left

with much politics and little
ecology.

Rldgeway and

Cockburn state that:
^°

.'P^lifi-^l ecology' has become
the intentions of radical
movenients
the United States: the struggle
against
the adoption of nuclear power as a
major part o? the
^""^^^^
.r-T 7lt country (most produced a vigorous activism
notably in New Hampshire in
f
the fight
of the Clamshell Alliance against
brook nuclear plant) very distant from thP the Searather sedate operation of the eco-loby.^^ original
a
a\sefui^LVnrH°''
usetul way of describing

m

,

To be sure, ecocentrists will have nothing
to do with nu-

clear power.

Still it is not

a

simple matter to find an

alternative source of energy while leaving the entire
economic and social structure in place.

The implementa-

tion of solar power facilities is impossible without
total alteration of society.

Such genuine change, eco-

centrists believe, is only possible as
sciousness.

This is the project of

a

a

change in con-

political ecology.

As our two writers have it, ecology,

science, is
cl arify.
it

a

a

taken beyond

very vague notion which they are unable to

"Ecology, now a word used so haphazardly that

is useful more as a signpost than a definition,

does

drag in its wake many of the more important social and

.
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political issues of the last
decade. -66

What these writers
do not see is the bifurcation
in consciousness which
confines most proponents of
apparent radical social change
to

homocentrism.

An explanation for this
tendency is that

their definition of politics
remains

a

captive to the tra-

ditions that conspire against nature
and

a

human relation

to it.

Grahame Beakhust in his paper "Political
Ecology"
defends the thesis that "politics and
ecology are intimately
linked in both theory and practice."
Earlier
he says

that "political ecology transcends and
incorporates much
of political economy. "^^ There is something
important in
this remark.

A sustainable economy and equitable social

relations are crucial to the kind of fellowship and
sensitivity to wild nature characteristic of ecocentrism.

William Ophuls, in his Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity
also indicates the requirements of

a

sustainable society.

The basic political problem is the survival of the
community; two of the basic political tasks are the
provision of food and other biological necessities
and the establishment of conditions favorable for
reproduction.
Neither of these can be accomplished
except in the human household provided by nature and
in this sense politics must rest on an ecological
foundation
It

is

necessary to look at these conceptions of the rela-

tion between politics and ecology for their theoretical

promise or lack of it.

Because Ophuls appears to be

profoundly tied to homocentric rationality, he does not

,

,
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realize thaC the thrust of
his Ideas makes their
own
rational basis inappropriate.
Seeming at times aware
of this,

he tends to shift ground
and make conflicting

claims about the nature of

a

political ecology.

He thereby

has trouble reconciling versions
of Western political

thought with the centralism of
his book.

For Instance,

he says

For Aristotle, as well as for
Plato and
political theorists, 'politics' concerns other maior
thfs s^rCLle
to live
the community on the earth, and
it therf?
'^^'^^^ government narrowly
defined
detined.
A?is?nT^
't^'^P
Aristotle asks
how this political animal can
design and create institutions that will
assure the
survival of the city of man and some
measure of the
good life within it.^^

m

The problem Ophuls encounters is the lack
of a

theory of ecological society, which certainly none
of the

political philosophers provided, nor would they have
understood the concept.

It was argued in chapter two that

Aristotle provided a concept of relational morality that
went

a

long way toward demonstrating why moral ideals must

be rooted in a whole way of life,

and its foundation in being.

furnished by

a

community

In a hierarchy of existence,

Aristotle's ontology, the patterns of becoming for all
forms of being required no further theory of society. It

should be understood that in Aristotelian philosophy the

human subject was understood in
as subject.

a

larger picture of nature

With the disintegration of ontological founda-

tions for community, the
basis for intellectual
and .oral virtue could no
longer be understood.

proble. was to conceive
could supply

a

(rational)

Ophuls'

theory of self and society
that

surrogate for such ontological
foundations
that disappeared long ago.
But Ophuls did not recognize
this problem and instead
innocently stated the concept
of
an ecosystem as a model for
an ecological foundation.
Of
course, this provides no motivational
forces for any new
kinds of human behavior.
Without this, however, there
could be no sustainable society.
a

Ophuls' uncertainty about how an
ecological

foundation is supposed to guide politics is
due to a
failure to clarify his depiction of nature.
His opening
brief account of scientific ecology as a
"web of
natural

interdependency"71 does not lead systematically to
his
politcs of the steady state.
Beakhust, similarly, moves without caution from

•

ecology to economy to politics, thinking that the
safest
route for a political ecology is to avoid the appearance
of saving "nature" as its objective.

He fears the criti-

cism that political ecology may resemble

a

"new puritanism

which, in the guise of saving nature, thunders with irrevo-

cable contempt for our species." 7 9

His fear reflects the

bifurcation in consciousness which first separates the

hu.an social world fro. the
world of other species and
then
alleges that environmentalists,
because they would save
other species, disdain their own.
This is a standard ploy,
polarizing man and nature, the
better to keep nature forever al.ien.
Political ecology theorists understand
that
a socially tansf ormative
idea is needed, but they have
yet
to see that the well-being of
wild nature
is a key idea.

When they do, they will be able to
show that environmentalists qua ecocenrists are not proponents
of a nature which
subverts human purposes, as homocentrists
charge.

The fear of homocentric criticism issues
in a sense
of futility and constant up-hill battles
for environmental

organizations as well as for environmental theorists.

This

futility is at the heart of an environmentalist's dilemma,
for if an environmental organization like the Sierra
Club

argues that their good is the good of society then they
are locked into

a

fruitless debate with other homocentrists

who see the good of society in strictly socio-economic
terms.

The Sierrans may assert an interest in the "quality

of life," but they would be forced to capitulate to the

economic version of this nebulous idea, or they must show

how to reconcile the good of humanity with the preservation
of nature.

Lacking such an explanation, the Sierrans and

others are destined to an interminable quest for an ill-

defined condition of life.

As long as the thinking of
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political ecologists reniains
within the homocentric orbit,
they perpetuate the dilemma of
activists and all whose
intuitions tell them

that

something is terribly wrong.

Locked into the reasoning patterns
that produce
a conflict between economy
and ecology, political ecologists find only the thinnest of
political prescriptions
for the attainment of their environmental
image of the

good society.

The debate has been fruitless, or
productive

only of paradox.

As Allaby and Bunyard say:

Environmental awareness has become the privilege
of
those who
modern terms are able to improve their
lot.
Many sociologists, the late Anthony Crosland
tor example, claimed that such awareness
was primarily
a middle-class phenomenon and, as
such, must be given
less weight in terms of politcal action than in
raising the_ standard of living of those presumably
still
classified as working class and underprivileged. That
argument is somewhat circular since a polluted, unpleasant environment can hardly be synonomous with a
high standard of living; hence, if making a high standard of living creates more pollution and environmental degradation, the raising of the underprivileged
to a more satisfactory standard will be unattainable.'^-^

m

The methodological problem of disunity between

economy and ecology and in relation to psycho-social behaviors stems from the deeper problem of politics.
of the bifurcation,
ly,

the concept of work,

Because

taken instrumental-

follows from the concept of an economy independent of

ecology.

A series of logical forces are set up that have

no interactive meanings

conceptual was tes
was tes

.

,

,

but generate outcomes serving as

and of course, material and ecological

The waste of soil and the decline of soil health

.

.
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on the giant farr.s follows this
logic in its connection
with the concept of agribusiness.
Wendel Berry puts it
well
^^^^
^^^^ ^^""^^
abusing our land
this way partly in order to
correct ou? 'balance
of payments '-that is, in order
to buy foreign
petroleum.
In the language of some
'agribusiness'
experts we are using 'agri-dollars' to
offset the
drain of petrodollars.' We are, in
effect, exporting
our topsoil
order to keep our tractors ^unning.M^
.•^
in

m

One needs to see the economic and social
system
to which this logic is tied to see in turn
the point of

diverting awareness from
being:

a

human ideal of integrative

work, purpose, fellowship, and kinship with the

land to produce the "person" would be an ideal fully

subversive to the logic of fragmentation and the commodity

network
An enormous system of rationalization defends

against these charges.

The defense is generally of the

sort that deals with bogus issues in the genre of "pro-

gress."

One prominent Russian scientist makes this sort

of claim in the most extreme manner,

showing thereby that

the nature of self and the self's relation to land, envi-

ronment, and moral understanding are nonexistent considerations, but "efficiency" and "progress" are.
Do humans harm themselves by acting upon their natural
environment? Most of the ecologists are of the opinion
that this is exactly the case.
I do not subscribe to
this view, for the following reason: if our ancestors
had turned the whole of our planet into a well-cared
for nature preserve about 300 to 500 years ago (when

.

U9
they began their massive
onslaught on nature
modern society would not be
abll to ex?st
speaking, the balance of
nature Is
ho„.?
"f^^
1

'

—

bHun^i:

:n^%a?h^r^;;^1^:,^r^"'

only if tLlrnui^er7r:Lirinch:nged!^5^"
Later, he says,

proDiems tacmg it.
The present trends of
general and the earth sciencedevelooment
In oar
ticular, furnish enough proof that
in future too
all
ecological problems will be tackled.
We wUl
of science

m

,

W

^-^nological capabulties

to

-design' 'and"''''^
''''^^^^
environment necessary for
on. ^JrJ
t
our
development,
This conviction backs up the
optimistic concept that human society will
have truly
unlimited possibilities for progress^^b
.

.

.

Political ecology develops as

a

response to this kind of

thinking
The politics of homocentrism has been
schematized

just in order to briefly illustrate the themes,
problems,

and concepts developed in the preceding chapters.

counterweight of an ecocentric politics is
one for modern thinkers.

a

The

difficult

Their efforts to develop

a

political response to the outrages they feel has generally
not been an adequate articulation of the root problem;

instead, they tend to do battle with the surface phenomenon
of environmental destruction.
A response to Fedorov that merely argues against

the technological "fix" would be to confirm his line of

argument, to accept his conceptual framework, and to help

deflect attention from the far more crucial issue already

discussed, the question of what
kind of world „e want.
FedoroVs argument proceeds as If the
debate were about the
facts themselves, as If It were
a question of their truthfulness.
To ignore the major assumption
embedded In this
argument Is to concede that all along
there never was any
environmental problem.
The task is to develop a political
ecology that

fully comprehends the pathology of homocentrism

.

Eco-

centrists never believed that "modernity" or
"technology"
were themselves implicated in the problem.
Their concerns
imply a full acceptance of such facts, and then
move on to
the problems incurred as a result of our condition.

The

inadequacy of the efforts made so far is that they do not
serve well in the role of the interrogator of the homo-

centric mind.

These efforts should be examined in detail.

Early poli tical ecology
The notion of stages of political ecology derives

less from the order of appearance of

a

work than from what

it contributes to a conception of a moral politics.

it approximates an ecocentric outlook,
is able

As

political ecology

to make connections between polity and wild nature.

The least well-developed idea for

ecology is contained in Ark

II:

a

political

Social Response to Environ -

mental Imperatives by Dennis Pirages and Paul Ehrlich.
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This work pays no attention to
the concept of a human nature; instead, it focuses on
politics understood as what

governments do.

Its characterization as a
political ecology

is owed to its view that a
fundamental alteration of society
is a necessity.
The authors exhibit signs of
understanding

that rational-factual argument about
environmental hazards
does not persuade, let alone move
others to action, but
they are unclear about the prescriptive
nature of their
task.
Their prologue states their case.

Noah had ample warning from a respected authority
to
buildhis Ark, and he used his time to good advantage.
Skeptics laughed, ridiculed, and drowned— but Noah
the original prophet of doom, survived. We too
have
been warned that a flood of problems now threatens
the persistence of industrial society, but this
time
the ark cannot be built out of wood and caulking.
We must ensure our survival by redesigning the political, economic, and social institutions of industrial
society.
If a new institutional ark cannot be made
watertight in time, industrial society will sink,
dragging under prophets of doom as well as skeptics
'
and critics
.

'

All the talk about how we must redesign social

institutions and how we must face other imperatives has
been part of the standard fare environmental writers have
served up.

The serious obstacles in the way of realizing

these aims have not stopped the flow of rhetoric.
these aims were realized

— namely,

Yet if

the change in social in-

stitutions, the curbing of some behavior, curbing the worst
abuses of the environment

— what

really would change?

The

goal of a steady state sustainable society would be as far
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away as it ever was.

Behavior indicative of

a unity of
man and nature, for example,
humaneness toward animals,
would still be exceptional.

Ehrlich and Pirages tell us that

"...

a

new

society could be based on development
of human characteristics that are now lacking. "^^ But
since they spell out

vision of social change that does not
escape the homocentric orbit, their "new" social arrangements
a

are part

of the same bifurcated consciousness they
see as perni-

cious.

They say "The new society cannot be created
with-

out new people to live in it."^^

and how do we create them?

Who are these new people

All they tell us is that

Unless we learn to cooperate rather than compete, to
do unto others as we would have done unto ourselves,
to see other people to be like us, and to work for
the good of all mankind rather than just for the good
of a few, little of significance can be accomplished.
Empathy must become a universal quality.
People
must identify their fate with the fate of all mankind,
or there will be no way to overcome the global tragedy
of the commons. °^
About these imperatives we are told, always on some pretext,
that terrible problems lie ahead unless we change our be-

havior.

None of the many writers who have said this seem

to comprehend the homocentric phenomenon which prevents

recognition that the desired social world is impossible
without

a

social theory and politics directed at an

ideal construct of self and world.

These authors appear

oblivious to the social scheme, its consciousnes s

,

and
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official assumptions generating

social reality.

a

With the homocentrisfs denial
of wild nature, a
whole realm of possibilities opens
up for freedom of action.
Placing only those restrictions
on one another which are
prudential in character, homocentrists
are free to do anything.
"Freedom- and "obligation" are, of
course, complex
words that are constructed on layer
after layer of historical ideas.
The bifurcation has erased large
portions of
such content.
One preservationist organization
says "save

their world, its your world too "—apparent
ly not realizing
!

the irony.

Our authors, similarly, appear to be "out to

lunch."

Other statements Ehrlich and Pirages make are
equally incongruous.

"Indeed, humanistic faiths, stressing

the unity of all mankind and of human beings with nature,

could be an essential part of

a

major transformation."^^

Humanistic faiths about the unity of mankind have been
around for

a

long time and they are quite ineffectual.

Although it is possible to posit
which does not accept

a

a

naturalistic humanism

dichotomy between humans and nature,

they do not explain these unities as part of any theory.
The major problem here is that nature is not given any

content.
a

This lack of content leaves the authors without

theory of how to link the good of nature with the good

of society.

.
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Ark^

begins with a litany of
environmental woes
and ends with a call for
social change.
Unfortunately
the good of all humankind is
not necessarily the good
of
the environment taken externally.
If social transformation seems distant, authoritarian
techno-bureaucracy seems
all too feasible.
Given the environmental concerns
of
Ark_II and the observation that the
average citizen is

politically incompetent, it follows for
Ehrlich and Pirages
that:

Long-range planning in a very complex society
will
require a much higher level of competency
in politics
Governing must be transformed into a profession
that
is reserved for wise and dedicated
individuals rather
than being allowed to remain an arena where
representatives of vested interests fight to retain
their disproportionate share of the rewards. There will be
little room for mistakes in coordinating the affairs
of a densely populated and highly interdependent
society, if that society is to survive future
challenges
They neglect to tell us how there could be

disinterested bureaucracy

,

a

wise and

not caught up in factualism,

that would also produce the kind of leaders they call for.

Their notion of social transformation remains philosophically unsophisticated.
So far the construction of a political ecology

has not moved much beyond the idea that unless we have

more authoritarian forms of government, hopefully by benevolent and wise authoritarians, the world will meet an

unhappy fate.

Political ecologists have allowed themselves

to be construed this way,
as R.D. Holsworth
notes in a
critique of this idea.^^
Holsworth argues that political

ecologists such as Paul Ehrlich,
Dennis Pirages, Garrett
Hardin, Robert Heilbroner, and
William Ophuls

misunderstand crucial elements of
the 'crisis'
and Ignore the emancipatory
potential within the
ecological censure of the liberal-capi
talis? and
state-socialist politics. The eco-criti?
men??oned
above have described with acumen
the delete??ois con
sequences of liberal-capitalism's
development? But
^^^-'^^ ^^^^^^
incapacities of
our'nn?yf
'^r^organization, their call
our
political
for an end to
liberalism ironically terminates by
recycling the
solution of the most distasteful liberal,
Thomas
Hobbes,
the guise of tragic realism. 8^
.

.

m

This reading of the political ecologists
is highly selective.

Ehrlich and Pirages manifest

a

deep ambivalence

about the solution to the environmental problem,
although

their prognosis of the problem is that we are faced
with
the prospect of a dead end for man.

share this ambivalence and prognosis.

Heilbroner and Ophul
Holsworth, in con-

trast, is skeptical about the prognosis although he sheds
no further light of the problem.
The terms of crisis and eco-disaster as employed by
political ecologists can also be an obstacle to clear
headed analysis. Whereas their warnings purport to
be based on accurate scientific predictions, they
furnish us only the most minimal details of the
impending crisis.

Stage one of political ecology is founded on the
idea that because we are headed for global disaster we

must ensure our survival by turning government decision

making over to authorities competent to take the right

actions.

This leaves it open to

a

two-pronged attack.

On
one side it is all too possible
to throw open to question
the whole notion that a disaster
is impending.
On the
other side, it is an easy task to
criticize the solution
that elite managers, autocrats,
or authoritarians will
somehow save us, even while we lose
our political freedoms.
As long as political ecology is
narrowed to these terms
a

critique like Holsworth's is inevitable.

Holsworth

forgets his remark about "emancipatory
potential" and
does not argue much beyond a vaguely worded
notion that

"...

participatory varients of democracy

for ourselves

...

.

.

.

preserve

the significant decisions concerning

the direction of our lives. "^^

If Holsworth had looked

at the social transformation theme in Ark II

he would

,

have noticed the implicit participatory idea that at least

struggles for recognition in this work.

Ehrlich and Pirages' suggestion that

a

social

transformation would bring about human characteristics
now lacking would be more compelling if it were accompanied
by a critique of present characteristics and a theory of

social change.

If social change were linked to a philoso-

phy of nature, the beginnings of an ecocentric political

ecology would emerge.

—
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Fu rther developments in political
ecology

Ecocentrists believe they can have

profound impact

a

on consciousness by affecting
political institutions; they
are ambivalent about the transformative
potential of the

average citizen.

In Robert Heilbroner's The Human
Prospect

,

the average citizen is viewed through
the spectacles of

liberal individualism.

In this regard, Heilbroner, as a

political ecologist, is hard pressed to show
how environmental problems could seem immediate to millions
of people
for whom experience is personal pleasure and
pain. In everyday life, talk about the prospect for humankind
seems ab-

stract and far away.

The quotidian closes off all public

events as outside the domain of experience.

People see

their next meal looming larger than all the problems in
China.

Heilbroner writes:

... we face the horrendous possibility that humanity
may react to the approach of environmental danger by
indulging in a vast fling while it is still possible
a fling entirely justified by the estimation of
present enjoyments over future ones. On what private,
'rational' considerations, after all, should we make
sacrifices now to ease the lot of generations whom
we will never live to see?
There is only one possible answer to this question.
It lies in our capacity to form a collective bond of
identity with those future generations.
Contemporary industrial man, his appetite for the
present whetted by the values of high-consumption
society and his attitude toward the future influenced
by the prevailing canons of self -concern has but a
limited motivation to form such bonds. °^
,

Heilbroner wonders whether, in the light of impending
environmental catastrophe, society can be changed from
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its present "calculus of selfishness
parading as reason-^S to
one in which the identif icatory
sense prevails.
This is
the one glimmer of hope in an otherwise

despairing view

of industrial man or woman, a view
of certain obdurate

human characters tics

.

His allegation of "selfishness"

should have been recognized in terms of
the context that

legitimizes it.

This is the same context in which the

threat of "surgical" nuclear strikes against an
imagined

enemy is consigned to the realm of the public event.
If individual selfishness were the problem,

then

it would be a question of individual volition, of
individ-

uals attempting to rise to

a

social challenge and failing

to do so because each one was too mean spirited.

centrism does not exist simply because we have

a

Homo"self-

indulgent culture" but because each individual is cut off
from virtually everything else.

Because Heilbroner diagnoses our socio-political

problem in terms of the narrow, egocentric individual, he
too falls into the trap of calling for centralized power,

perhaps taken to repressive extremes.
Thus in all likelihood we must brace ourselves
for the consequences of which we have spoken the
risk of 'wars of redistribution' or of 'preemptive
seizure,' the rise of social tensions in the industrialized nations over the division of an ever more
slow-growing or even diminishing product, and the
prospect of a far more coercive exercise of national
power as the means by which we attempt to bring
these disruptive processes under control.
If then, by the question 'Is there hope

—

.

.

.

for man?' we ask whether ^^ no

such hope: 90

-u-.

be:

'

No, there is no

This result is a consequence
of his refusing to free
himself from a Hobbesian diagnosis.
His explanation clearly
does not fit all the facts,
but is rather a conventional
construct.
In particular, there are
certain environmentalists who do not fit his view.
Heilbroner's thesis
would look very different had he
taken account of the

bifurcation in consciousness.
As a contribution to the concept
of a political

ecology, Heilbroner's statement about our
capacity to form
a collective bond of identity with
future generations is

invaluable.

He falls short, however,

in his analysis about

how this collective bond could be formed.

Recall that he

says contemporary man "has but a limited motivation
to

form such bonds."

Clearly, Heilbroner thinks that moti-

vation and intention are to the point.

Could such

mation of the will come about on its own?
clearly that it cannot.

a

refor-

the answer is

Heilbroner does not see that the

issue is not motivation but transformation through the

concept of
tive,

a

politics of selfhood aiming toward

a

coopera-

sustainable society.
The political ecologists discussed here
all have

.
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the inclination to imagine a
moral politics, but then in
despair turn from this promise to
the idea of repressive,

authoritarian rule.

Yet the subtleties of dealing
with

this idea philosophically are
demanding and conceptually
elusive.
The interrogations, critiques,
and observations
set out in these pages do not
themselves form a complete

theory

Confronting antienvironmentalism
A view of the problems confronting the
development

of a political ecology and a consequent version
of self and

world must deal with the widespread ideology of antienviron-

mentalism.

Predictions of "environmental catastrophes"

invite a query about what counts as such

Because

a

world catastrophe would be

a

a

catastrophe.

complex event and

all of its dimensions would be impossible to describe in

advance, political ecologists leave themselves open to
two accusations.

The first is that they predict a future

catastrophe which has yet to be described.

Will such a

catastrophe be the end of civilization as we know it, the

extinction of humanity, or something less far reaching?
Second, H.M. Enzensberger

,

in his paper "A Critique of

Political Ecology," tells us that the prognostications
of political ecology imply an expertise in many branches
of science,

including

L31

The charge is that political
ecologists really cannot say
what the future holds because no one
can.
Reactions from

both the "right" and the "left" lock
political ecologists
into a center position from which the
left describes them
as having a class bias, while the right
attacks them as

"dooms ters

"
.

However, no writer

has

actually offered

counter analysis to that which Ophuls gives.
to see how Ophuls'

It

argument can be contravened.

a cogent

is hard

He shows

us in the substantive sections of Ecology and the Politics
of Scarcity that all of our technological wizardry will

not be able to feed

people.
a

a

world population of eight billion

Given the international situation of the present,

world population of four bi.llion is not being sustained.

Hunger and malnutrition are rampant problems, especially
in the third world countries.

Ophuls'

lengthy and well

argued attack on runaway population growth invites

counter attack from the left

— the

a

same attack which Paul

Ehrlich incurred at an earlier date.

Enzensberger tells

us that these neo-Mal thusian arguments are only the

propaganda of the ruling classes.

93

In conclusion to

:
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lengthy argument he quotes
in fu]

a

Cuban source.

Here is the quote

1

^P^^^^'' °^
question many times.
wi'^f
We recall his words now: 'In
certain countries the^
that only birth control provides
a soluMnn'?^'^g
tion to the problem.
Only capitalists, the exploiters
can speak like that; for no one who
in
what man can achieve with the help of conscioSs of
technology and
science will wish to set a limit to the
human beings who can live on the earth. number of
That is
the deep conviction of all revolutionaries,
'what
characterized Malthus in his time and the neo-Malthusians
our time is their pessimism, their lack of
trust
the future destiny of man.
That alone is
reason why revolutionaries can never be Malthusians.the
We shall never be too numerous however many
of us
there are, it only we all together place our efforts
and our intelligence at the service of mankind, a
mankind which will be freed from the exploitation
of man by man.'^^
(emphasis added.)

m
m

Beyond this socialist rhetoric it remains unclear how
there will be enough room for billions more.

analysis goes unanswered. In such

a world,

Ophuls

every acre

of land will be turned over to improved agriculture. If

present trends such as commercial development continue
in the United States,

the bread basket of the world, we

can look forward to mass starvation.
Yet it is only because environmental catastrophe
is

stated in physical terms that the poltical ecologists

are replied to in kind.

The problem from an ecocentric

perspective is less how to feed an overabundant population
than what kind of culture these populations will develop.

Because consciousness is shaped by conditions in the
world, overcrowding narrows consciousness to survival

'
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considerations alone; all else is
obliterated.
vival conditions alone are already

Since sur-

the lot of most peopl G

in the third world countries,
it is charged that to want
anything else is "elitist" or
"imperialistic."

Ecocentric politics can readily acknowledge
that
the world's wealth is not equitably
distributed,

and that

if it were, many of the third world
problems would be

alleviated.

They can say this and still want to keep
wild

nature alive where it remains.

The bifurcation is the

central fact that ecocentrists can never forget.

If human

survival in the third world is at the expense of wild
nature, it is also the case that in the United States wild

nature is exploited to gain even more wealth.

So even if

poverty were ended in the third world we should have no
reason to suppose that its end would bring about the survival of all species.

In fact,

the bifurcation of con-

sciousness will always be the sufficient condition for

exploiting wild nature and destroying species.
On the other hand, abandonment of homocentrism is

equivalent to working for equity among peoples.

To unify

the consciousness of everyone's needs with the needs of
all living things is to expand consciousness toward all

life.

Such equity would then be understood as the support

for everyone's highest aspirations.

The ecocentric devel-

opment of consciousness would result in the higher welfare
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of societies within and among
themselves because its reunification of humanity and wild
nature represents the welfare
of humanity.

Conclusion

The political ecologists discussed
in this work

have launched a social critique in which
they raised issues
about our destruction of the environment.
Complaining that

certain human attitudes are responsible for our
plight,
Ophuls in particular has come close to saying that
something more than just superficial social change is
necessary
He insists that

a

"genuine morality" must arise, although

he does not describe this morality.

ecologists strongly urge

a

All four political

new morality as the way out of

our environmental predicament.

Even Heilbroner's cynical

stance is counterbalanced by the hope that
ethic will come to the fore."

dismally far from reflecting

a

"survivalist

Yet such vague hopes are
a

genuine understanding of

the practice of environmental morality.

The relational quality of an ecocentric morality

derives partly from attempting to grasp true membership
in a community of humanity and nature.
be derived from historical theory.

It cannot,

For though

of the relational self is found in Aristotle,

a

however,

version

there has
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been little temporal experience
of the relational self i
western cultures. How can we
account, then, for the appearance of an Ideal of ecocentrlsm
occurlng In a society of
homocentric outlook?

m

Intimations of the Geocentric view
now appear as
a reaction to the extreme
banality of contemporary culture.
Though ecocentrism is impossible to
understand from the
homocentric point of view, it does, nonetheless,
provide
the only genuine alternative to instrumental
relativism.
But this assertion forces us to pose the
question:

can

ecocentric consciousness survive, or will homocentrism

nullify its project and thereby the mind which belongs
to it?

The project is the multidimensional effort to

reconsider our modes of inquiry, our approach to knowledge and moral reasoning.

thought and action.

Ecocentrism is

a

revision of

The theory of a political ecology

is the medium for this revisionary work.

To realize a

certain vision of the world is to understand the epistemic
project.

It is clear beyond doubt that the present modes

of social consciousness will lead to the extermination of

most nonhuman life, to an overcrowded planet, to the

ultimate reduction of the human self in its object form,
to an organism at war with most others of its kind,

an existence reduced to its

to

most basic forms, aiming
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at .ere survival.

m

these pages the confrontation
with

this consciousness produced
a set of problems showing
that such a future can only
be a failure of the human

promise and potential.

It follows

that if humanity does

physically survive in this mode of
consciousness, it will
be a survival that is perhaps
not worth
the effort.
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